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M

any factors contributed to the Internet’s
growth over the past 25 years, but we’d like to
highlight an underappreciated catalyst. In 1996,
Congress enacted a law, 47 U.S.C. §230, to
immunize websites from liability for third-party
content. Section 230 is an “Internet exceptionalist” law;
Congress made the liability rules for online content different from, and more favorable than, the rules for offline
content.
Section 230’s immunity from liability for third-party
content has provided the foundation for the Internet we
know today. Each of the top 10 U.S. websites relies heavily
on third party content and, in turn, §230.
Editor’s Note: This is a collection of essays submitted
by internet law scholars and attorneys about Section 230
and the legacy of Zeran v. AOL. Continue scrolling down for
links to the full articles.
However, the scope of §230’s immunity wasn’t necessarily clear from Congress’ words, which are characteristically inscrutable. Instead, §230’s implications first became
clear from the first appellate court opinion interpreting it,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling in Zeran v. AOL.
The Zeran case involved a pernicious cyber-harassment
attack. An unknown perpetrator posted inflammatory messages to AOL purporting to be from Zeran, which prompted
outraged readers to bombard Zeran with angry phone calls.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that §230 protected AOL from
liability for publishing the inflammatory messages.
The Zeran case interpreted §230 quite broadly, providing liability immunity even when online publishers exercise
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editorial control over third party content, and even when
the online publisher fails to respond to takedown notices.
Due to its timing and its breadth, the Zeran opinion had an
enormous influence on subsequent courts’ interpretations
of §230, leading them to apply the statutory immunity
expansively across a wide range of circumstances.
Together, §230 and the Zeran ruling helped create a
trillion-dollar industry centered around user-generated
content. Because of its influence on such a key issue, the
Zeran ruling is widely considered the most important Internet Law ruling ever.
It is also a controversial opinion, and debates about the
ruling’s conclusion and implications continue to this day.
Indeed, Congress is currently considering making its first
major substantive reduction to §230’s immunity, and much
of the debate over these proposals revisits the mid-1990s’
policy debates over how best to reduce anti-social behavior
online. Despite the passage of time and evolution of technology, the underlying policy questions remain as fresh
and important as they were two decades ago.
Zeran was decided 20 years ago-on Nov. 12, 1997. To
commemorate this anniversary, we asked nearly two dozen
experts in Internet Law to share their thoughts about the
case. We invited authors with normative views that span the
§230 debate, so the group of authors includes both fans and
opponents of the Zeran ruling and §230 generally.
Their essays generally fit into two categories. Some
essays take a historical approach, explaining how we got
§230 or the Zeran ruling. The other essays discuss the
legacy and impact of the Zeran ruling over the past two de-
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cades, some enthusiastically celebrating the developments
and others issuing stinging criticisms and calls for reform.
We learned a lot from this collection of essays, and we
hope you will too.
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‘Zeran v. AOL’ and
Its Inconsistent Legacy
Ian Ballon discusses the differing approaches to
how the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in ‘Zeran v. AOL’
is applied in different circuits.
By Ian C. Ballond

In January 1996, shortly after it was enacted, I wrote one of
the first articles on the Good Samaritan exemption created
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. §230(c)—
popularly referred to as the Communications Decency
Act or CDA), correctly arguing that it preempted claims
against interactive computer service providers and users,
not merely for defamation, but for a broad array of claims.
I did not, however, envision that subsection 230(c)(1) would
be construed as broadly as it has been over the past two
decades, or that subsection 230(c)(2) would be applied as
infrequently. Indeed, when the district court and then the
circuit court decided Zeran v. AOL, I was critical of their analytic approach, as some may remember from early articles
in The Cyberspace Lawyer.
The law, however, is written by courts, not commentators,
and the rule of Zeran has been uniformly applied by every
federal circuit court to consider it and by numerous state
courts. And it has never been rejected in any precedential
opinion. Indeed, it is perhaps a fitting tribute to the viability
of Zeran that 20 year later the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in its 12th opinion construing the CDA, barely
spent even a sentence affirming dismissal of a defamation
claim brought against Facebook over user content, pursuant
to the CDA and the rule first developed in Zeran. See Caraccioli v. Facebook., _ F. App’x _, 2017 WL 2445063 (9th Cir. 2017).
The broad preclusive effect of the CDA recognized by
Zeran has been extended beyond mere defamation cases to
an array of disputes where third parties seek to hold Internet
sites or mobile app providers liable for the misconduct of
users. Because conduct online takes the form of content—as
users act through key strokes, smart phone virtual buttons
and emoji— the CDA has been applied where conduct ultimately is premised on user content. Thus, for example, courts
have held that the CDA preempts claims by parents against
Internet sites and services where children have met adults
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who then allegedly abused them, by the widows of personnel
killed by ISIS, and by victims of sex traffickers against publishers of online classified ads that led to their victimization. It
has also been held to preempt claims by a tort victim against
the Internet service where the plaintiff’s assailant had allegedly purchased the gun used against him, against a social
network for failing to promptly remove a profile that allegedly
led to violence, for failing to act to prevent statements made
in a chatroom, and for strict product liability and related
claims brought against eBay for transactions between users
of its platform. See Ian C. Ballon, E-Commerce & Internet Law:
Treatise with Forms 2d ed. §37.05[1][C] (enumerating cases).
There are, however, differing approaches to how the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Zeran v.
AOL is applied in different circuits.
Most circuits construe the CDA broadly, consistent with
Zeran. See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24
(1st Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of claims for civil remedies
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act,
18 U.S.C.A. §1595, and Massachusetts Anti-Human Trafficking
and Victim Protection Act of 2010, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265,
§50); Obado v. Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90, 91-94 (3d Cir. 2015)
(affirming dismissal for failure to state claims for defamation,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and
invasion of privacy against various service providers, search
engines and domain name registrars for republishing and
allegedly manipulating search engine results to maximize the
impact of allegedly defamatory content, based on the CDA);

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2017 issue of The Recorder.

Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
the assertion that MySpace could be held liable for failing to
implement measures that allegedly would have prevented
a minor from being contacted by a predator, and stating
that these “allegations are merely another way of claiming
that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications
and they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of online
third-party-generated content.”); Jones v. Dirty World
Entertainment Recordings, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014)
(vacating and reversing a jury award for the plaintiff over
highly offensive comments posted on a gossip website);
Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming
dismissal of a Fair Housing Act claim).
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fair
Housing Council v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008) (en banc), broadly construed what constitutes development, which could strip away CDA protection for an
interactive content provider by treating it as an information
content provider for user content in narrow circumstances
where the site is deemed to have developed the user content. While this interpretation ultimately is narrow, clever
plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit try to plead around the CDA
by alleging development in the hope of moving a claim past
motion practice to discovery.
The Ninth Circuit also has recognized a number of
fact-specific, narrow exceptions to the CDA that have not
been recognized by other circuits. See Doe No. 14 v. Internet
Brands, 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a service
could be sued for failing to warn of a dangerous user of its
site, but only to the extent the provider’s knowledge was
acquired offline); Barnes v. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.
2009) (holding that a provider could be sued for promissory
estoppel if it voluntarily undertook to do something that

the CDA otherwise would not require, such as removing
user content); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003)
(carving out a narrow exception when a communication
republished by a defendant was not originally intended for
publication).
Courts also have taken differing approaches to the
question of what constitutes a claim pertaining to intellectual property, within the meaning of section 230(e)(2),
which creates an exclusion to the otherwise broad preemption provisons set forth in sections 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2).
Compare Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the CDA preempted a state right of publicity
claim) with Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d
288, 298-304 (D.N.H. 2008) (disagreeing with Perfect 10
and holding that the CDA did not preempt plaintiff’s right of
publicity claim); and Atlantic Recording v. Project Playlist,
603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (construing the
literal language of the statute the same way as the court in
Doe and declining to dismiss plaintiff’s common law copyright claim).
Depending where a party is sued, these differences can
impact whether CDA immunity is determined early, and
relatively inexpensively. The Fourth Circuit, which decided
Zeran, observed 12 years later that CDA “‘immunity is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability’
and ‘it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to
go to trial’ ….” Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com, 591
F.3d 250, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Exceptions to and variations in the way the CDA is construed in
different circuits, even if narrow, ultimately impact whether
the immunity afforded by the CDA can be quickly vindicated
or whether, in a given case, it may be lost—or at least diluted—through protracted litigation.
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Section 230 Keeps
Platforms for Defamation
and Threats Highly
Profitable

T

he modern legal dialectic around the First
Amendment is harsh and dauntingly complicated. The prevailing topical U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence values free speech because it
can contribute to human meaning-making and
construction of selfhood, and has the potential to produce
the sorts of ideas and information that can lead to human
enlightenment. The court also deeply distrusts governmental regulation of speech, and has articulated powerful
doubts about the government’s ability to competently
balance social costs and benefits pertaining to speech,
especially when driven by censorial motives. Actual living
human beings and their emotions do not much factor into
either the court’s positive or negative justifications for free
speech. See generally Toni Massaro, Helen Norton and Margot Kaminski, “SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence
Reveals about the First Amendment,” 101 Minnesota Law
Review 2481 (2017).
Section 230 takes this free speech-rooted disregard
for people and their feelings, and ramps it up a few notches, immunizing online media companies from liability for
hosting not only anything the First Amendment protects,
but also from the reach of most of the very limited speech
restrictions that First Amendment jurisprudence disdainfully tolerates.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can host maliciously
defamatory speech that would not be protected by the
First Amendment. They can host threats of violence that
are outside the First Amendment. They can host obscenity as long as it is not comprised of child pornography, and
they can host panic-inducing online equivalents of shouts
of “Fire!” in crowded theaters without fearing civil suit or
arrest, as long as no federal crime is committed.
As it happens, defamatory speech, threats and obscenity almost never rise to the level of federal crimes. According to one legal scholar, “it is now generally accepted
that the First Amendment forbids criminal penalties for
defamation.” Actionable threats must be “true threats”
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and require a higher level of culpability than negligence;
it is not clear that even a showing of recklessness would
be adequate. And the federal government has only rarely
pursued obscenity charges for content that did not involve
or depict children since 1988. Even when completely outside the protections of the First Amendment, almost any
speech can be hosted on a wholly for-profit basis, featuring
paid advertisements or charging subscription fees, without
fear of legal responsibility.
Section 230 asks nothing in return for this extensive
ISP immunity. The ISPs can’t be forced to remove offending
content unless it fits within what are mostly very narrow
exceptions, as demonstrated by twenty years of litigation.
The only broadly interpreted immunity exception is for
intellectual property, which §230 actually cares about because it is rooted in money and commerce and intangible
“property” rather than people and their messy and seemingly inconsequential emotions.
ISPs don’t have to keep track of who posts what, or
identify any person doing the offensive posting unless they
want to, or choose to comply with an appropriately drafted and served subpoena, meaning legal representation is
generally necessary to successfully identify the source of
harmful speech.
Section 230 has therefore made hosting defamation,
threats and exhortations that lead to panic or violence into
a lucrative online business models. Twenty years ago, AOL
strategically ignored Ken Zeran’s horrific victimization by
an anonymous internet hoaxer.
Today, acts of online harassment directed at contemporary Ken Zerans are more likely to fill the enormous
coffers of companies like Google, Facebook, Twitter, GoDaddy and Reddit. The platforms may change over time but
the basic framework remains the same. Eyeball attraction
generates demand for online services such as web hosting,
cloud computing, advertising, data analytics, storage, and
domain name registration.
Hatred can be very profitable. Research conducted by
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ProPublica “surveyed the most visited websites of groups
designated as extremist by either the SPLC or the Anti-Defamation League ... [and] found that more than half
of them-39 out of 69-made money from ads, donations or
other revenue streams facilitated by technology companies. At least 10 tech companies played a role directly or
indirectly in supporting these sites.” ProPublica further
found that: “PayPal, the payment processor, has a policy
against working with sites that use its service for “the
promotion of hate, violence, [or] racial intolerance.” Yet
it was by far the top tech provider to the hate sites with
donation links on 23 sites, or about one-third of those
surveyed by ProPublica.”
A recent Pew Research Center survey found that
41% of adult Americans “have been personally subjected
to harassing behavior online, and an even larger share
(66%) has witnessed these behaviors directed at others.
... [N]early one-in-five Americans (18%) have been subjected to particularly severe forms of harassment online,
such as physical threats, harassment over a sustained period, sexual harassment or stalking.” A full 58% of those
who have been harassed online said it happened via social
media, while for 23% their “most recent” harassment experience occurred in the comments sections of a website;
for 15% the harassment occurred via a text or messaging
app. Occasionally, ISPs will help out individual harassment
victims. But they are not required to do so, and usually
they will not.
A few large social media platforms are voluntarily addressing some online harassment campaigns to
appease advertisers and large, well organized interest
groups, with intermediations that focus on hate speech
targeted at groups that share common characteristics
such as race, gender, sexual orientation, political beliefs or
religion. Some affected individuals see such interventions
as inadequate, while other people see them as censorious
threats to freedom of expression online. The companies
that own these platforms are much more likely base their
strategies for addressing online harassment on what is
most profitable than striving to carefully balance privacy, safety, and speech interests. Section 230 endorses
an approach to speech that is entirely driven by money.
The online media companies that rein in threats and hate
speech on their platforms in turn create profitable opportunities for the emergence of new social media platforms
on which anything goes.
Even with a strong commitment to expansive free
speech principles, a sense of decency and fair play should
make one question the legitimacy of §230 as currently
written and interpreted. Manufacturers, food producers,
and companies in the service industries have to take
responsibility for goods, no matter how large the company or how prodigious its output. But gigantic, fabulously
wealthy companies like Facebook, Google and Twitter do
not have to take any responsibility for the harms caused

by the online platforms they own, control and profit from.
Section 230 means that companies are allowed to facilitate or ignore speech-ignited harms they absolutely have
the right and ability to control, as long as someone else is
the speaker.
Some people tout §230 as the law that created the
Internet. But given the willingness of social media, e-commerce, Internet search and web hosting businesses to do
business in nations that lack laws anything like §230, histrionic claims that without §230 successful and creative
online companies like Google, Facebook and Twitter would
not exist or could not thrive are unsupportable.
As I have argued before ISPs would still be profitable
even if they were required to affirmatively mitigate the
most severe of the harms that result from some portion
of the online speech they host. China has one of the
most highly censored Internets in the world, and it still
has highly innovative and extremely profitable Internet
companies. This is not at all, in any regard, a suggestion
that the United States should follow China’s example with
respect to Internet regulation. It is simply to note that
China has high levels of both censorship and innovation
simultaneously, and remains a desirable market for U.S.
companies despite the intensive censorship. Chinese
social media company Tencent is the second largest in
the world, second only to Facebook, and both Tencent and
its Chinese social media competitor NetEase are larger
and more profitable than Twitter. And Facebook, currently blocked by the Great Firewall of China, is still trying to
find its way back into the Chinese market, using innovative approaches. So is Google.
Germany has recently instituted a law against hate
speech that will require ISPs to police their own platforms.
This law applies to social media sites with more than two
million users in Germany. Other European Union members
may do the same. But no large Internet company has
yet suggested it will retreat from the German Internet or
from the European Union generally. Again, this is not an
endorsement of Germany’s approach. It is simply offered
as further evidence that the absence of §230 style ISP immunity does not dissuade large Internet companies from
participation or profit seeking.
In the United States, as long as §230 remains in place
and unchanged, the only options for badly victimized
parties are to engage potentially costly lawyers who may
not be able to help them, or to employ expensive and
potentially unsavory reputation defense companies that
have few if any effective tools to offer. Thoughtfully carving out a few more exceptions to §230 aimed at reducing
serious online harassment will not break the Internet.
Ann Bartow is a professor of law at University of New Hampshire School of Law, where she has led the Franklin Pierce Center for
Intellectual Property since 2015. Prior to entering the academy in 1995,
Professor Bartow practiced law at the firm then known as McCutchen,
Doyle, Brown & Enersen in San Francisco.
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Policy Architecture and
Internet Freedom
What the ‘Zeran’ case reminds us is that the
Internet could not become what it is today
without a “policy architecture” that facilitates a
no-gatekeeper technology.
By Jerry Berman

T

he Internet has emerged over the last two
decades as the dominant medium of electronic
communication, commerce, and speech in the
world.
In the United States and other western democracies, this decentralized, no-gatekeeper network of networks
allows billions to connect and communicate with each other
and the world both individually and through intermediaries
like AOL in the early days and Facebook and Twitter today. It
is a medium of communication like no other. It allows anyone
and everyone with a computer and Internet connection to
publish and speak.
When we celebrate the Internet, we most often focus on
the genius of the technology and the innovative technologists, the “Wizards who Stayed Up Late,” the creators of the
World Wide Web, devices like the IPhone and incredible social
applications like Google and Facebook. And we should!
However, what the Zeran case reminds us is that the
Internet could not become what it is today without a “policy
architecture” that facilitates a no-gatekeeper technology.
Zeran, upholding §230 of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), embeds in law that Internet ISPs can connect millions
of users without the burden of liability for the speech engaged in by those speakers.
ISPs may publish and post but only the speaker is liable for his or her speech, such as the arguably defamatory
speech posted on AOL and directed at Zeran. And no liability
meant no gatekeepers. And the shield of Zeran has stood up
to protect ISPs from legal liability for a variety of objectionable speech published on the Internet.
Without §230 of the CDA, or some legal regime akin to
it, the potential of the Internet would have been stifled. AOL
and other intermediaries would have been forced to do the
impossible: review and edit postings in advance, hire a squad
of lawyers to limit postings, and defend a myriad of lawsuits.
Large and well-financed operators could operate, but speech
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would be limited and new applications might never have
emerged if required to finance costly legal overhead to do
business on the Internet. It is almost impossible to imagine
the rise of Facebook or Twitter without the “breathing room”
afforded by §230.
It is important in this context to emphasize that §230 was
not a foregone outcome of the legislative and legal battle
from which it emerged. I was one of the leaders of the Interactive Working Group (IWG), an ad-hoc non-partisan coalition
of industry and advocacy organizations formed to oppose
the CDA. The IWG included companies, industry associations,
and advocacy organizations that included a diversity of the
communications and emerging Internet industry and advocacy organizations, both liberal and conservative.
I believe it is instructive to consider how IWG worked to
bring about §230. The lessons learned are particularly important today in the face of mounting calls by legislators and
states attorney generals to revisit and revise §230 to limit the
liability shield of intermediaries to counter a growing list of
harms including sex trafficking, cyber bullying, hate speech,
fake news, and incitement to terrorism and violence.
In 1995 the CDA was proposed to address pornography
on the Internet. The solution was simple: extend the indecency rules governing mass media radio and television to the
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Internet.
As the CDA, sponsored by Senator James Exon (D-Neb.)
moved through the Senate (hereinafter EXON CDA), the
IWG faced an uphill battle. We decided to educate lawmakers that the Internet was fundamentally different in architecture and operation. The IWG worked to educate policy
makers about the nature of the new technology and focused their attention on user empowerment blocking tools
to empower users to control what was available on their
computers to meet their own choices and protect children.
We made the case that this was the only effective, and least
restrictive, constitutional way to address objectionable
speech in this new medium.
The IWG also sought persuade Congress to support
a Sen. Patrick Leahy’s (D-VT) proposal (S. 714, the Child
Protection, User Empowerment, and Free Expression in
Interactive Media Study Bill, April 1995) to “study” the new
medium.
However, Congress has never met a pornography proposal it did not embrace. Indeed, regulating pornography
was a particular promise in the Republican “Contract with
America” that Republicans used to frame the 1994 election, and it resulted in Republicans getting control of the
House and Newt Gingrich the speakership. Thus, despite our
efforts, the Exon CDA passed the Senate in June 1995. (For
more background on the CDA, see Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency
Act: Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway).
In the House, the IWG moved in a different direction. We
persuaded the House Speaker to declare Exxon unconstitutional. On June 20, 1995, Newt Gingrich put out the following statement
I think that the Amendment you referred to by Senator
Exon in the Senate will have no real meaning and have no
real impact and in fact I don’t think will survive. It is clearly
a violation of free speech and it’s a violation of the right of
adults to communicate with each other. I don’t agree with
it and I don’t think it is a serious way to discuss a serious
issue, which is, how do you maintain the right of free speech
for adults while also protecting children in a medium that
is available to both? That’s also frankly a problem with television and radio, and it’s something that we have to wrestle with in a calm and mature way as a society. I think by
offering a very badly thought out and not very productive
amendment, if anything, that put the debate back a step.
Under that cover, IWG worked with Reps. Chris Cox (RCA) and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) to propose alternative legislation, H.R. 1978, the Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, June 30, 1995 (hereinafter Cox-Wyden). IWG put
together a study published by the Center for Democracy
and Technology called Parental Empowerment, Child Protection and Free Speech in Interactive Media. Jerry Berman
and Danny Weitzner of CDT, Jill Lesser of People for the
American Way, and the late Ron Plesser of Piper and Mar-

bury, wrote the study. The study recommended a non-regulatory approach along the lines of §230. As Sen. Leahy
acknowledged, the IWG study became the policy framework
for Cox-Wyden and §230.
Cox-Wyden passed the House as a freestanding amendment to the main Telecommunications Act then before the
Congress in response to the Exxon CDA. Essentially, the
House (by an overwhelming vote) took a wholly different
approach to the problem of objectionable speech than the
Senate.
Heading into conference, pressure from family groups
supporting the Exon CDA mounted; and neither Wyden nor
Cox was appointed as conferees. But our coalition put up
enough of a fight to persuade the conferees to adopt all of
§230. The provision, as opposed to the creation of a “Federal Computer Commission,” nevertheless remained in the
final CDA section of the Telecommunications Act to shield
intermediaries from legal liability for defamation and other
forms of objectionable speech or “Good Samaritan” efforts
to protect and empower users against such speech. For
more on this, see the panel discussion featuring Sen. Ron
Wyden, Jerry Berman, Danny Weitzner and others on the
Statute that Saved the Internet in 2013, celebrating §230 on
its 15th Anniversary.
The subsequent court battle resulted in a Supreme
Court decision striking down the Exon CDA as violating the
First Amendment, but also upholding as constitutional both
the findings and operative provisions of §230. While we
know the case as ACLU v Reno as the ACLU was the first to
file a challenge to the law in court, the Circuit and Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of a second challenge to the
CDA.
After the ACLU filed, three members of the IWG (CDT,
AOL, and the American Library Association) organized a
second challenge to the CDA, American Library Association
v. Reno (hereinafter the ALA case), that was consolidated
with the ACLU challenge. For the inside story of these challenges, see Kara Swisher, AOL.COM.
In court, ALA lawyers presented the case and focused
on the nature of the technology. They argued that in this
vast sea of content, the CDA violated the First Amendment
because the most effective and least restrictive means for
addressing objectionable content was to empower users to
choose what content to access themselves. Adopting this
rationale to strike down the Exon CDA but leaving §230 in
place, the decision transformed the Communications Decency Act into the “Communications Freedom Act.”
The lesson going forward is that a legal challenge was
not enough to address the threat to the Internet. It required
the presentation of an alternative solution that could prevail
in Congress and pass muster in the courts. See John B. Morris, Jr and Cynthia M. Wong, Revisiting User Control: The
Emergence and Success of a First Amendment Theory for
the Internet Age. To achieve this result, defenders of the Internet had to engage in legislation and litigation and devise

practical effective policy alternatives and solutions.
Today, pressure is mounting to enact exceptions to
§230. Civil liberties groups are making the case in litigation
that exceptions that expose intermediaries to broad liability
would fundamentally shift the Internet to a gatekeeper regime. But even if the 230 defense holds, there are problems
to resolve that involve new policy initiatives in forums other
than the courts.
Ironically, the Good Samaritan provisions that exempt
intermediaries from liability for taking steps to limit “objectionable speech” could begin to have unintended negative impacts on speech if ISPs bow to pressure and censor
hate speech or fake news and other forms of controversial
speech under the “Good Samaritan” protection of §230 that
shields them from liability for doing so. The drafters of §230
at the time envisioned an Internet of many ISPs competing
for customers and providing such a wide range of speech
platforms that censorship would be minimized. And this has
worked well.
But today, with few ISPs exercising huge network effects
(like Facebook that serves over 2 billion users), “Good Samaritan” speech limitations, however well intentioned, might

curtail the ability of all to speak and access information because few entities control the platforms. This, in turn, might
create pressure for government to regulate content decisions by intermediaries for or against one form of speech or
another.
To address these new speech issues, we need a new
Interactive Working Group coalition to oppose unwise
tampering with §230 but who work together to flesh out
and propose workable solutions and best practices to foster
Internet industry self-government. If “intermediaries” like
Backpage are in fact producing the content advertised on a
site, lawmakers could find a solution that treated such a provider as a content producer outside the intermediary liability
protection of §230. And if intermediaries take steps to limit
content, they should be working together to develop “best
practices and standards” to control objectionable speech
without harming the First Amendment. Without workable
private sector alternatives, the government may step in and
pass legislation that would pass constitutional muster but
hamper an open Internet.
The Internet was not born free. It was made free and will
only remain free if a concerted effort is made to keep it free.
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Sex, Scandal and
Intermediary Liability:
Imagining Life Without
‘Zeran v. AOL’
The Bazee.com legal saga highlights what could
happen without a strong third-party liability
protection standard for Internet businesses.
By Hillary Brill

A

s I was settling into my role as eBay’s first Legislative Counsel, my office received an urgent
call from CEO Meg Whitman requesting help
with the India Situation, a.k.a. “Operation Save
Avi!”
It was 2004 and Avnish Bajaj, American citizen and Harvard Business school graduate, was head of eBay subsidiary
Bazee.com. Up for auction, without his knowledge, was a link
to a video clip of New Delhi students having oral sex. The
seller, a different student, listed the item for a little under $3.
The clip was never sold and was never shown. Avi had nothing
to do with the video and never even viewed it.
The illicit item was immediately taken down by Bazee.
com upon notification of its pornographic content. The end
user license agreement prohibited pornography and Bazee.
com acted accordingly. The company, and Avi personally, fully
cooperated with all legal proceedings and complied with all
requests by the Indian government. Despite his cooperation,
Avi personally was arrested and charged with violating India’s
Information Technology Act of 2000.
Under the act, Avi faced up to five years in prison and
thousands of dollars in fines. Specifically, §67 establishes
liability for anyone who “publishes or transmits or causes to
be published or transmitted material in any electronic form
which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit act or
conduct,” even without knowledge or intent. Moreover, §85 of
the act imposes liability not only on the person who engaged
in the violation of the act but also on the person in charge of
and responsible to the company.
Avi’s arrest caused an uproar in the U.S. government.
Members of Congress became involved and then Secretary
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of State Condoleeza Rice called on the Indian government to
ensure Avi’s safety and to grant him a fair trial. The U.S. embassy submitted a statement indicating that there was a high
level of interest in the U.S. government regarding the case.
While eBay’s government relations team felt like we were
doing our best to save Avi, it was almost Christmas Eve and
Avi was sleeping on the floor of a jammed prison cell merely
because of third-party content posted on an eBay site. For my
team in Washington, it was unfathomable and terrifying.
Fortunately, cooler heads eventually prevailed, and soon
after Avi was released and charges were dropped. But the
Bazee.com legal saga highlights what could happen without
a strong third-party liability protection standard for Internet
businesses. Avi’s case is a real-world example where limited
liability protections in §230 of the CDA did not exist. A petri
dish scenario where we can observe what could happen
if there were not protections–like those established in the
seminal limited liability decision Zeran v. AOL–for intermediaries like Avi and Bazee.com from liability based on third-party
content.
In the United States, however, these liability protections
are in place and are the cornerstone of the modern day
internet and an enabler of the burgeoning Internet of Things
(IoT). Without the protections of §230, nascent e-commerce
companies like eBay or Amazon might not have grown into
thriving enterprises, and might not have survived at all. News
of a CEO thrown into U.S. prison because of something unknowingly listed on a site (not even sold) could have poten-
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tially brought e-commerce to a standstill.
In India, the impact of the Bazee.com case led to an
appeal by industry to amend the Information Technology
Act of 2000 to provide liability protection to intermediaries
with respect to user-generated content. It took eight more
years for India to begin to implement a better system to
protect intermediaries from liability. In 2008, an amendment to §79 of the Information Technology Act created a
new standard of limited liability: “an intermediary shall not
be liable for any third party information, data, or communication link made available or hosted by him” and requires
“actual knowledge.” Additionally, it established a new notice
and take down regime with safe harbor provisions modeled
after the EU Directive 2000/31 and similar U.S. laws such as
§230 of the CDA and 17 USC § 512.
Even under this amended law, however, intermediary
liability protections in India remained limited compared to
the U.S. This proved true in Google India v. Visaka Industries, which involved a defamation lawsuit against Google
for not taking down alleged defamatory third-party blog
posts railing against the evils of an asbestos company.
Google argued for third party immunity under §79 of
India’s amended Information Technology Act 2000. The
Indian court refused to drop the defamation charges
against Google holding that Google failed to take any
steps to block or stop the dissemination of the defamatory material despite receiving notice.
In essence, the Indian court took the opposite approach
from the U.S. court in Zeran. Whereas Zeran construed
§230 broadly to bar lawsuits seeking to hold an intermediary liable for objectionable third-party content, the court in
the Google India case construed protections narrowly, such

that an intermediary may be held liable if it had knowledge
of allegedly defamatory content and failed to take it down,
notwithstanding the absence of any judicial finding of defamation.
While the Google India case is still on appeal, a landmark
decision in 2015 may increase Google India’s prospects and
suggests third-party liability protections are broadening. In
Singhal v. Union of India several liability-imposing provisions
of the Information Technology Act were held unconstitutional. Singhal involved the arrest of two women using social media to criticize local government. The court absolved
them of liability and struck down §66A of the Information
Technology Act because it imposed criminal liability based
on an unduly vague legal standard. Moreover, the court
examined §79 (at issue in the Google India case), and, while
it declined to strike down the measure, it held that liability may be imposed under the statute only if an Internet
company refuses to take down objectionable material after
a court orders it to do so.
Echoing the reasoning of Zeran, the Singhai court held
that “it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. to act [pre-emptively] when millions of
requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as
to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not.”
The Singhai case is a testament to just how far India has
come since the “Save Avi” days.
As we celebrate the 20th anniversary of AOL v. Zeran,
let us reaffirm that intermediary liability protections should
remain strong to encourage innovation and promote a thriving civil society both in the United States and worldwide.
Otherwise, another young legislative counsel may have to
save another Avi one day soon.
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How the Scam Artists at
Stratton Oakmont Made
‘Zeran’ Possible and
Unwittingly Saved the
Internet
It would be fair to say that this hugely favorable
result likely would never have come to pass
without an earlier court decision involving the
Stratton Oakmont brokerage firm, infamously
memorialized in the movie “The Wolf of Wall
Street.”
By Robert J. Butler

I

n Zeran v. America Online, the Fourth Circuit upheld
the broad grant of immunity for interactive service
providers set out in §230 of the Communications Act,
47 U.S.C. §230. The court found that the new statute
established a clear Congressional intent to exempt the
emerging online industry from the threat of liability for
information posted by others on their networks or transmitted over and through them. Obviously, this decision was
very gratifying to the industry, and especially to those of us
who had spent many months crafting and negotiating that
legislation. It would be fair to say, however, that this hugely
favorable result likely would never have come to pass without an earlier court decision involving the Stratton Oakmont brokerage firm, infamously memorialized in the movie
“The Wolf of Wall Street.”
The complex legal and political issues that ultimately generated §230 as it was reviewed in Zeran had their genesis in a
Senator’s desire to protect kids from pornography and other
objectionable materials available on this new technological
medium called the Internet, and a New York court that found
Prodigy Services Company, one of the preeminent online
pioneers, liable for millions of dollars because it tried to do
just that. Given the obvious disconnect between those perspectives, the path to a resolution that could protect Prodigy
and the rest of the online industry from potentially crippling
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liabilities was both far from clear and littered with proverbial
minefields. How we got from those early existential threats to
Zeran is an interesting exercise in legislative craftsmanship
and political theater, with a substantial dose of legal irony.
In brief, it all started with the Exon Amendment to §223
of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §223, as amended. [A
comprehensive early legislative history of this provision can
be found here.] Senator James Exon of Nebraska proposed to
update existing prohibitions in the Act related to obscene and
other objectionable materials and activities using a telephone
to include the new online medium. At virtually the same time,
Prodigy Services Company was fighting a lawsuit filed by the
Stratton Oakmont financial firm over allegedly defamatory
comments posted on a Prodigy bulletin board by some of
its users. Stratton Oakmont successfully argued that, since
Prodigy screened its postings for profanity, it could not take
advantage of the historical distributor/conduit immunity that
had saved an online rival from liability in a similar case, Cubby
v. Compuserve. As Washington counsel for Prodigy, I was
tasked to work with Senator Exon’s staff to address both of
these potentially devastating developments.
As originally introduced in 1994, Senator Exon’s amendment proposed simply to change references in §223 from
“telephone” to “telecommunications device” and to add
“communication” to “conversation” in order to accommodate
“changing technologies.” The challenge facing the industry
was to convince the Senator and others not to throw out the
Internet baby with the “dirty” bath water of Internet porn.
It would be impossible for online services to screen and
block access to all prohibited material, especially when such
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activities would expose them to inordinate liabilities for the
millions of other postings on their services. Unfortunately,
that debate would have to be held against the backdrop of a
Congress that had never seen anti-pornography legislation
that it didn’t support. The Stratton Oakmont case, which
was subsequently settled, provided the leverage to make a
skeptical Congress receptive to the industry’s need for protections so that it could act responsibly in the ever evolving
Internet environment.
After months of discussions with the online industry and
other interest groups, Senator Exon agreed to add language
to his Communications Decency Act (CDA) that disclaimed
the Stratton Oakmont precedent, which would otherwise
deter online actors from implementing his desired restrictions. See Report 104-23, 104th Cong., 1st Session (March
30, 1995). As further revised and adopted in conference as
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the expanded
statutory language prohibited, in relevant part, the use of
an interactive computer service to make indecent content
available to minors absent the implementation of good faith
restrictions on their access. However, it also ensured that
online services would not be held liable for merely providing
access (including incidental functionality such as browsers
and search engines) to prohibited materials so long as they
were not complicit in the creation, knowing distribution or
advertising of those materials. 47 U.S.C. §§223(e)(1)-(3).
This language was essential to recognize and protect the
role of these new technologies in the expanding Internet
space.
Moreover, while establishing the good faith provision
of blocking and screening of children’s access to restricted content as a defense to liability, 47 U.S.C. §(e)(5), the
Conference Committee version likewise expressly rejected
Stratton Oakmont by: (1) declaring that no actions could
be brought “against any person on account of any [lawful]
activity … taken in good faith” to restrict access to prohibited content, 47 U.S.C. §223(f)(1); and (2) preempting States
from imposing liability on commercial, nonprofit, and educational entities as well as libraries that is inconsistent with
this regime, 47 U.S.C. §223(f)(2). We hoped that, with these
and several other important revisions, public and private
network providers could receive at least some benefit from
passage of the CDA even if the remainder of the statute
survived judicial review.
Notwithstanding our success in mitigating the risk
posed by Stratton Oakmont and the CDA within the text
of the CDA itself, we recognized that the online industry
required more in the way of liability protection if it were to
realize its full potential. If liability arose from content not
addressed by the CDA, would the facially broad exculpatory language prohibiting lawsuits and disclaiming liability
still hold? What would happen if key parts of the CDA were
struck down by the courts, as we expected and in fact occurred? (See Reno v. ACLU.) How could we possibly anticipate how this technology would evolve and whether new
capabilities would give rise to unforeseen liabilities? Would
Cubby even remain good law for the Internet? Fortunately,

another vehicle had appeared that the industry could work
in parallel with the Senate’s CDA initiative.
Admittedly galvanized in opposition to the Stratton Oakmont decision, House members Chris Cox and Ron Wyden
introduced bipartisan legislation to remove that decision’s
glaring disincentive for online services to act responsibly
with respect to the information transiting their networks. I
and other representatives of the online industry, as well as
additional interest groups, were given the opportunity to
work with those Congressmen on their draft of the Internet
Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, including what
became known as the Good Samaritan Provision, as eventually codified in new §230 of the Communications Act. As
the latter name suggests, the initial core of that legislation
essentially mimicked the CDA’s protection against liability for good faith blocking and screening of objectionable
content. 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(2), (d)(3). But, the sponsors were
determined to go a step further here.
Initially, they included findings recognizing the value
of the Internet in making available “educational and informational resources to … citizens” and that it has “flourished … with a minimum of government regulation.” 47
U.S.C. §230(a). They then declared that it is U.S. policy “to
promote the continued development of the Internet” and
specifically “to remove disincentives [such as Stratton Oakmont] for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies” to enable parents and providers to
restrict “children’s access to objectionable” materials online.
47 U.S.C. §230(b) (emphasis added). Most importantly, they
also inserted the affirmative, broadly exculpatory statement
that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47
U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (emphasis added). In effect, this provision
both codified Cubby for the online world and extended its
reach beyond mere conduit services to cover all third party
content. Despite the obvious overlap with sections of the
CDA, the Conference Committee between the House and
the Senate accepted both provisions in their entirety with
only minor revisions, while specifically emphasizing their
intent to overturn Stratton Oakmont. Conference Report at
194. The next step would be judicial construction.
In the Good Samaritan Provision’s first major test, the
Fourth Circuit in Zeran concluded that subsection (c)(1)
of §230, as supported by and interpreted consistent with
Congress’ express goals in favor of the development of an
unregulated Internet and the empowerment of families
to control its use, does provide expansive immunity from
liability for online services for content provided by others
on their systems. Indeed, Zeran’s broad reading of the Good
Samaritan Provision has been upheld and applied repeatedly over the past 20 years, and the Internet has flourished in
large part as a result of that enlightened opinion. No other
piece of legislation or judicial decision has had a more positive impact on the online industry and its users. But, ironically, neither may have existed absent the litigious actions
of an unscrupulous brokerage firm in New York City.
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Serendipity and Internet
Law: How the ‘Zeran v. AOL’
Landmark Almost Wasn’t
Zeran v. AOL may not be a household name, but
it is the Internet’s most important landmark
ruling. This seminal court case, which was the
first…
By Patrick J. Carome and Cary A. Glynn

Z

eran v. AOL may not be a household name, but it
is the Internet’s most important landmark ruling.
This seminal court case, which was the first to
consider the meaning and scope of §230 of the
Communications Decency Act, has been a pillar
of the legal framework that has permitted revolutionary
services such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter to exist and
thrive. Under Zeran, websites are generally immune from
liability for unlawful or harmful third-party content. Put
simply, this precedent is largely responsible for the Internet
as we know it.
Over the past two decades, Zeran has been cited in over
250 judicial opinions and discussed in hundreds of law review
articles. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III’s masterful opinion in
Zeran has also stood the test of time. Virtually every U.S.
Court of Appeals, and many state supreme courts, have
looked to the decision as a reliable key for understanding the
reach and meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court has
denied dozens of cert petitions seeking to call Zeran and its
progeny into question, including in Doe v. Backpage earlier
this year. And Congress, in the course of enacting subsequent
legislation extending the reach of §230, has hailed the decision as having “correctly interpreted” the statute.
But Zeran as we know it might never have happened.This
essay examines various ways in which, if one or two stars had
aligned differently, the first case decided under §230 would
not have been Zeran, or at least not Judge Wilkinson’s profound and broad landmark. These many layers of serendipity
highlight how important legal developments—that in hindsight
may be taken for granted—may be affected by seemingly
small and even random events.
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For starters, it took the bizarre, cruel, and persistent
actions of an unidentified troll to set the ball in motion.
Whatever motivated the “author” of the online postings that
launched this controversy will probably never be known. But
his or her impact on Internet law is now clear. In April 1995,
six days after the terrorist bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City killed 168 people (including many
children), this miscreant used a series of AOL screen names
(including “Ken Z033” and “Ken ZZ03”) to post fake online
advertisements for “Naughty Oklahoma T-shirts” purporting
to celebrate the attack. T-Shirt “design #651,” for example,
would read “Finally, a day care center that keeps the kids
quiet – Oklahoma City 1995.” The slogan for “design #568”
was “Visit Oklahoma . . . . It’s a BLAST.” The ads directed viewers to call a phone number that Kenneth Zeran, a free-lance
artist and film producer in Seattle who had never been an
AOL subscriber, used for his home office. The ads told them
to “ask for Ken,” and added that, “due to high demand please
call back if busy.” There has never been any hint of why the
unfortunate Mr. Zeran was targeted.
See Figure 1, next page.
The cruel hoax might never have led to litigation if the
fake ads had not gained notoriety outside whatever subset
of AOL users (who then numbered around 2.5 million) might
have encountered them on the AOL “classifieds” bulletin
board where they were posted. But four days after the first
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Figure 1: Copy of Bulletin Board Posting Attached to Zeran’s Complaint

ad appeared, someone emailed one of the ads to Mark
Shannon, then the co-host of a popular morning radio show
(“Shannon & Spinozi”) on KRXO-FM in Oklahoma City. And
two mornings later, while on-air, Shannon “read out the slogans purportedly displayed on the Oklahoma City T-shirts,
attributed these slogans to Ken at the telephone number of
Ken Zeran, characterized the person who did this as ‘sick’,
and incited the audience to call” Ken. That broadcast, which
Zeran’s lawyers later described as “devastating,” itself
was not pre-ordained. Shannon had had the good sense to
try to contact Zeran directly before the fateful broadcast.
But there was yet another stroke of horrible bad luck for
Mr. Zeran—and another bit of serendipity that pointed this
controversy toward the courts: Shannon was unable to get
through to him.
Just shy of a year later (on April 23, 1996), Mr. Zeran
did, of course, commence litigation in federal court against
AOL. But he did not sue AOL in a forum that was likely to
lead to an appellate decision in the Fourth Circuit, where
Zeran was ultimately decided. Nor did he sue in his home
district in Washington state. Had he done so, any appeal in
the case would have gone to the Ninth Circuit. Instead, he
sued AOL in federal court in Oklahoma City, the same place
where, three months earlier, he had sued Diamond Broadcasting, owner of KRXO-FM. Perhaps his lawyers initially
sued Diamond/KRXO in Oklahoma City because they were
concerned about whether it could be successfully hauled
into court in Seattle, and then chose the same venue for
the suit against AOL as a matter of efficiency. Or, perhaps,
they expected jurors from Oklahoma would most readily
sympathize with a plaintiff who had been victimized by a
grotesque stunt that mocked the unspeakable tragedy that
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had occurred there.
If AOL had accepted Mr. Zeran’s choice of venue, his
case would never have come before Judge Wilkinson, and
any appeal would have gone to the Tenth Circuit. That
course was averted, however, because AOL’s initial move
was a motion that, in addition to seeking dismissal for
improper venue and failure to state a claim, requested, in
the alternative, a transfer to the Eastern District of Virginia,
where AOL was headquartered. The Oklahoma judge held
that venue was proper, based in part on AOL’s concession
that it was subject to personal jurisdiction there. Nevertheless, the judge granted transfer to Virginia as a matter of
“convenience,” mainly because AOL and its witnesses were
there.
If Zeran’s lawyers had sued Diamond/KRXO and AOL in
a single lawsuit—which would have been perfectly natural,
and which they unsuccessfully tried to accomplish after-thefact by asking the Oklahoma judge to consolidate the two
cases, the case probably would have stayed put in Oklahoma. Given the hoaxster’s disgusting statements about the
Oklahoma City bombing, one can only wonder whether an
Oklahoma-based court would have had greater skepticism
for AOL’s novel §230 defense than the judges who in fact
adjudicated the case: District Judge T. S. Ellis in Alexandria,
Virginia, and the Fourth Circuit in Richmond, Virginia.
Aside from uncertainties regarding whether and where
any claims by Mr. Zeran would be litigated, it was far from
certain that the litigation would revolve around §230. In
fact, as of late April 1995, when the fake ads appeared on an
AOL bulletin board, §230 —along with the rest of the Communications Decency Act and the rest of the Telecommunications Act of 1996—was not even on the books. Indeed,
those unfortunate events occurred a full two months before
Representatives Christopher Cox (R-Cal.) and Ron Wyden
(D-Ore.) introduced the original predecessor to §230, a bill
called the “Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act”
(H.R. 1978). And it would still be another seven months, until
February 8, 1996, before the CDA, including the final version
of §230, would be enacted and take effect.
Mr. Zeran waited until April 23, 2016—two days before
the one-year anniversary of the posting of the first fake ad
and eleven weeks after §230 was enacted—before suing
AOL. Perhaps his lawyers were focused on the one-year
statute of limitations for defamation actions under the laws
of many states (including Oklahoma and Virginia). If they
had been astute enough to know that §230 was under consideration and to recognize its potential impact, maybe they
would have accelerated their efforts and filed suit against
AOL a few months earlier, before President Clinton signed
the bill into law. In that scenario, Zeran v. AOL likely would
not have been the first case in which a court ruled on the
scope of §230’s protections for online intermediaries.
Both Judge Ellis and the Fourth Circuit later held that
AOL’s ability to invoke §230 in Zeran turned on the timing
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of the suit. Focusing on the language of what was then
§230(d)(1)—“No cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section”—the Fourth Circuit held that
“Congress clearly expressed its intent that the statute apply
to any complaint instituted after its effective date, regardless of when the relevant conduct giving rise to the claims
occurred.” Absent that holding and some fortuitous timing, Judge Wilkinson and his colleagues would never have
reached the merits of AOL’s §230 defense.
The Oklahoma City lawyers who originally represented
AOL in Zeran and succeeded in having the case transferred
were aware of §230’s enactment. They briefly discussed the
statute in the “merits” portion of the briefs supporting the
motion to dismiss they filed in federal court in Oklahoma.
Yet far from recognizing this might be a ground-breaking
case about the meaning of the brand-new statute, they
did not argue that the statute actually applied to the case.
Instead, apparently because §230’s enactment post-dated
the conduct at issue, they expressly conceded that “[t]he
Act may not operate to control the events upon which this
lawsuit is based unless it is found to be retroactive.” They
offered no argument at all regarding why §230 should control despite the timing of its enactment.
The arguments for dismissal that AOL’s Oklahoma
counsel did make focused on principles of negligence under
Oklahoma common law, including duty, foreseeability, and
non-liability for the deliberate acts of a third party. They
briefly alluded to the First Amendment. And, under the
heading “Recent Developments in the Law of Cybertorts,”
they contrasted the 1991 decision by a federal district judge
in Cubby v. Compuserve with the 1995 decision by a New
York state trial judge in Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy. They
only got around to discussing §230 in a two-paragraph
argument headed “The Future of Cybertorts,” in which they
described the new federal law, stated that it “supports”
Cubby and “eviscerates” Stratton-Oakmont, and noted that
“henceforth” it would “protect services such as AOL.” Had
AOL’s defense continued along these lines, perhaps AOL
would have prevailed on state law grounds. In those circumstances, the first judicial construction of §230 would have
been left to a different case in a different court.
After the case traveled east, serendipity struck even
in the way Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, where the senior
co-author of this article (Patrick Carome) had been practicing media law for nearly a decade, became involved. Neither
Carome nor Wilmer had previously done work for AOL, even
though it was an up-and-coming new-media company in
Vienna, Virginia, not far from Wilmer’s main office in Washington, D.C. A month or two before the transfer, however,
Carome learned that an in-house lawyer at his client The
Washington Post, Elizabeth Blumenfeld, was about to switch
jobs and join AOL’s fast-growing legal department. Carome
asked Blumenfeld to keep an eye out for opportunities for
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AOL to retain him and his firm. Soon after she got to AOL,
Blumenfeld called Carome about a case that was being
transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, for which AOL
needed to select new counsel: Zeran v. AOL.
The process AOL used to select new counsel for the
case was an in-writing “beauty contest.” The in-house
lawyers, Randall Boe and Blumenfeld, asked Wilmer and
two other Washington law firms known for their significant
media litigation practices to each submit a written proposal setting out a strategy for defending the case and an
estimate of fees. Carome and two of his colleagues, John
Payton and Samir Jain, dove into the exercise. Even though
AOL had already used its one shot at a motion to dismiss
under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), and even though its Oklahoma
counsel had come close to conceding that §230 was inapplicable to the case, the Wilmer team devised a strategy to
bring §230 front and center. Specifically, the team proposed
that AOL (1) file an answer asserting §230 and the First
Amendment as affirmative defenses, (2) move for judgment
on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c) based solely on
§230, and (3) argue in that motion that application of §230
would not be impermissibly “retroactive.” Wilmer also proposed a loss-leading fixed fee: $50,000 to defend the case
through a decision on the proposed Rule 12(c) motion. Even
20 years ago, that was an aggressively low figure, especially
because that fee would also have to cover Wilmer’s handling of many other tasks, including responding to pending
discovery requests and taking Mr. Zeran’s deposition, which
had to be done quickly to meet the demanding pretrial
schedule set in the Eastern District of Virginia, which was
then (and is now) commonly called “the rocket docket.”
Based on the competing firms’ written submissions
and some follow-up telephone calls, AOL retained Wilmer.
At least one of the other firms did not mention the §230
defense in its proposed case strategy. A reliable source
recently said that AOL asked one or both of the other two
firms to match Wilmer’s proposed fee, but they did not.
Wilmer’s §230-centric strategy also was important to AOL,
which was keenly aware of the broader significance of this
case to its business model. That strategy prevailed, both before District Judge Ellis and, ultimately, in the Fourth Circuit.
Had Wilmer not been invited to pitch for the representation,
or if AOL had chosen different lawyers, might the path and
outcome have varied?
Nor, of course, was the role of the most important figure
in this story—then Chief Judge Wilkinson—preordained. As of
July 1997, when briefing of the appeal was completed, there
were 16 judges on the Fourth Circuit (three of whom were
on senior status), any of whom (absent a conflict of interest)
could have been assigned to the case. In 1997, the Fourth
Circuit issued 283 published decisions. Judge Wilkinson
participated in 61 of them, and he wrote an opinion for the
court or a concurrence in 33, with 24 for a unanimous court.
So, when the long chain of events described above finally

This essay is part of a larger collection about the impact of Zeran v. AOL curated by Eric Goldman and Jeff Kosseff.

Page 3

landed Zeran in the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
the statistical chance that Judge Wilkinson would cast a
vote in the case was at best one in five. And if there was to
be a published decision from the Fourth Circuit in the case,
the statistical chance (as of the time the appeal was filed)
that it would turn out to be a unanimous opinion penned by
Judge Wilkinson (as occurred in Zeran) was less than one in
10.
As Carome, his colleague Samir Jain, and AOL in-house
counsel Randall Boe awoke in Richmond on October 2, 1997,
none of them knew (or could know) which judges would
be present when Zeran was called for oral argument later
that morning. The Fourth Circuit’s protocol was then (and is
now) not to announce the composition of its panels until the
morning of oral argument. The first thing Carome did after
checking in with the clerk’s office that morning was to go
to a courthouse telephone booth to dial a colleague back in
Washington, to get a quick read on the three judges he had
just learned would hear the case: Chief Judge Wilkinson;
Circuit Judge Donald S. Russell; and, sitting by designation,
Judge Terrence Boyle, then the Chief Judge of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
Carome worried about the seemingly conservative bent of
the panel—two Reagan appointees (Wilkinson and Boyle)
and a Nixon appointee who before Watergate had served as
a legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC).
He also worried whether any of the members of the panel
had familiarity with an interactive computer service such as
AOL, CompuServe, or Prodigy. All three judges had been on
the bench since at least 1984, well before the popularization
of email and the Internet. Judge Russell was 91 years old,
and his appointment to the court (in 1971) predated “the
first public demonstration of the ARPANET.”
One potentially hopeful note Carome gleaned from his
team back in Washington was that Judge Wilkinson had a
newspaper background. In between stints as a law professor
at University of Virginia School of Law, he worked for three
years at The Virginian-Pilot in Norfolk, including as editorial page editor. Perhaps his on-the-ground experience in
traditional media would give him a heightened appreciation
for the sort of free speech interests embodied in §230. In
fact, that experience may well have had a bearing on the
important First Amendment notes that Judge Wilkinson
later struck in Zeran, including his reliance on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, which,
he wrote, “recogniz[ed] that fears of unjustified liability produce a chilling effect antithetical to [the] First Amendment’s
protection of speech.”
Having Judge Wilkinson on the panel, and having him be
the author of the decision in favor of AOL, was no guarantee that the case would produce the broad, plain-spoken
holding of Zeran that has been cited so often over the
past twenty years: “By its plain language, § 230 creates a
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federal immunity to any cause of action that would make
service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service.” Judge Wilkinson and his
colleagues might have hewn more closely to the ideal of
judicial minimalism, heralded by scholars such as Harvard
Law Professor Cass Sunstein, which expects judges to issue
narrow rulings confined to the facts at hand. The opinion
in Zeran may not have strictly adhered to that approach,
broadly declaring websites immune from so-called “distributor liability” (i.e., the sort of notice-based liability that
the First Amendment might allow the law to impose on a
bookseller) and declining to confine §230 to only defamation claims. While the opinion was both brilliant and correct,
a narrower ruling could have emerged. Fortunately, Judge
Wilkinson instead took a deep interest in the case and
issued a well-reasoned and sweeping opinion. Both in the
case at hand and for years to follow, this ruling by a highly
regarded conservative jurist, who was then Chief Judge of
a conservative court, has ensured that §230 has had the
effect Congress intended: lifting what would otherwise be,
in Judge Wilkinson’s words, “an impossible burden in the
Internet context.”
After the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the case was not
entirely over. Mr. Zeran filed a cert petition for review in
the Supreme Court. It seemed highly unlikely that the high
Court would take an interest in the case. As this was the
first case to construe §230, there obviously was no conflict
among appellate courts, and the Supreme Court rarely
engages in mere error correction. The Wilmer team and
AOL advised the Supreme Court that it would not submit
a brief in opposition to Mr. Zeran’s petition. But on April 21,
1998, three years to the week after the posting of the fake
T-shirt ads, the Supreme Court called for a response to Mr.
Zeran’s petition. The uncertainty finally ended two months
later, when the Supreme Court denied the petition, leaving
Judge Wilkinson’s landmark opinion in place as a steady and
bright—but perhaps not foreordained—beacon to lead other
courts across the country.
***
In an alternate universe in which the Zeran landmark
never materialized, the first judicial decision addressing the
scope of §230 probably would have come from a state court in
a case involving the “third rail” of child pornography. Captioned Doe v. AOL, that case was filed in the Circuit Court for
Palm Beach County, Florida, on January 23, 1997. That was
exactly nine months after Mr. Zeran sued AOL, and about ten
months before the Fourth Circuit’s Zeran decision. After Zeran,
Doe v. AOL was the next case to be filed anywhere that would
produce a reported court decision construing §230. It also was
the only other case to reach and resolve the “retroactivity”
question that was decided in Zeran.
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The plaintiff in Doe v. AOL was a mother, referred to
as Jane Doe, suing on behalf of herself and her minor son,
John Doe. The defendants were AOL and an AOL user
named Richard Lee Russell. If the facts in Zeran were very
bad, the facts in AOL v. Doe were horrible. In 1994, Russell, a
neighbor of the Does, allegedly lured John Doe, then eleven
years old, and two other boys to engage in sexual activity
with each other and with Russell. Russell allegedly photographed and videotaped those acts, and then used AOL
chat rooms to market those materials to other pedophiles,
resulting in the sale of at least one of the videos. By the
time the suit was filed, Russell was in federal prison based
on these activities. Jane Doe alleged that AOL had known
that its chat room feature was being used in this manner
by pedophiles. One of the more memorable refrains of her
court papers was that AOL had knowingly allowed its chat
rooms to become the “Home Shopping Network” for child
pornography. She asserted claims for negligence and negligence per se, referencing Florida criminal statutes prohibiting the sale or distribution of obscene materials. AOL could
not remove the case from state to federal court because
there was no diversity of citizenship (both Jane Doe and
Russell were from Florida) and because the availability of a
federal defense generally does not provide a basis for federal question jurisdiction.
As in Zeran, AOL retained Wilmer to defend Doe, and
once again the defense strategy focused on §230. At each
step of Florida’s multi-level court system, the presiding judges could look to, and rely on, Zeran as a basis for dismissing
all of the claims asserted against AOL. In June 1997, the
Florida Circuit Court (the trial-level court) granted AOL’s
motion to dismiss based on §230, citing Judge Ellis’ threemonth-old decision in Zeran. Jane Doe promptly appealed
to the Florida District Court of Appeal. In October 1998, a
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed “[f]or the
reasons expressed in Zeran.”
Although the Florida Court of Appeal’s decision in Doe
was unanimous, it nevertheless called for the Florida Supreme Court to examine the case. “[D]eem[ing] the questions raised as to the application of §230 of the Commu-
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nications Decency Act to be of great public importance,” it
certified to the state high court three questions: whether
§230 applies in cases where the events predate the statute’s effective date, whether §230 preempts Florida law,
and whether §230 provides immunity to a computer service
provider that had notice of the allegedly unlawful postings.
By a bare 4-3 vote, the Florida Supreme Court approved
the decision of the Court of Appeal. The majority’s decision
closely tracked Zeran’s reasoning and block-quoted large
swaths of Judge Wilkinson’s opinion. Aligning with Judge
Wilkinson, the slim majority held that “the gravamen of
Doe’s alleged cause of action” was “liability based upon
negligent failure to control the content of users’ publishing
of allegedly illegal postings,” which are “analogous to the
defamatory publication at issue in the Zeran decisions.”
Would the final vote in Doe v. AOL have been the same
if Zeran had not already blazed the trail? The facts were
arguably more shocking than in Zeran. Perhaps one of the
justices of the Supreme Court of Florida would have tipped
to weighing Floridian interests more heavily than federal
interests. Even with the benefit of Zeran, the three dissenting justices met the majority with stinging disagreement.
Justice Richard Lewis called the majority’s interpretation
“absurd,” “totally unacceptable,” and based on “faulty
analysis.” He asked why a website alerted to impermissible content posted by a customer of its service “may, with
impunity, do absolutely nothing, and reap the economic
benefits flowing from the activity?”
***
Judge Wilkinson got it absolutely right in Zeran. And, we
are confident that, even if the Zeran landmark had never materialized, the courts of the United States nevertheless would
ultimately have reached a consensus in construing §230 to
provide broad immunity for online intermediaries, as Congress
intended. But the path to that outcome might have been more
difficult and tortured if the first appellate decision interpreting
the statute had come from a less bold, brilliant, and respected
jurist than Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson.
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20 Years of Protecting
Intermediaries: Legacy of
‘Zeran’ Remains a Critical
Protection for Freedom of
Expression Online
Section 230 has proven to be one of the
most valuable tools for protecting freedom of
expression and innovation on the Internet.
By Cindy Cohn and Jamie Williams

A

t the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
we are proud to be ardent defenders of §230.
Even before §230 was enacted in 1996, we
recognized that all speech on the Internet relies upon intermediaries, like ISPs, web hosts,
search engines, and social media companies. Most of
the time, it relies on more than one. Because of this, we
know that intermediaries must be protected from liability
for the speech of their users if the Internet is to live up
to its promise, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in ACLU v. Reno, of enabling “any person … [to] become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than
it could from any soapbox“ and hosting “content … as
diverse as human thought.”
As we hoped—and based in large measure on the
strength of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran—§230 has
proven to be one of the most valuable tools for protecting
freedom of expression and innovation on the Internet. In
the past two decades, we’ve filed well over 20 legal briefs
in support of §230, probably more than on any other issue,
in response to attempts to undermine or sneak around the
statute. Thankfully, most of these attempts were unsuccessful. In most cases, the facts were ugly—Zeran included. We
had to convince judges to look beyond the individual facts
and instead focus on the broader implications: that forcing
intermediaries to become censors would jeopardize the Internet’s promise of giving a voice to all and supporting more
robust public discourse than ever before possible.
This remains true today, and it is worth remembering
now, in the face of new efforts in both Congress and the
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courts to undermine §230’s critical protections.

Attacks on §230: The First 20 Years
The first wave of attacks on §230’s protections came
from plaintiffs who tried to plead around §230 in an attempt
to force intermediaries to take down online speech they
didn’t like. Zeran was the first of these, with an attempt
to distinguish between “publishers” and “distributors” of
speech that the Fourth Circuit rightfully rejected. As we
noted above, the facts were not pretty: the plaintiff sought
to hold AOL responsible after an anonymous poster used
his name and phone number on an AOL message board
to indicate—incorrectly—that he was selling horribly offensive t-shirts about the Oklahoma City bombing. The court
rightfully held that §230 protected against liability for both
publishing and distributing user content.
The second wave of attacks came from plaintiffs trying
to deny §230 protection to ordinary users who reposted
content authored by others—i.e., an attempt to limit the statute to protecting only formal intermediaries. In one case,
Barrett v. Rosenthal, the attackers succeeded at the California court of appeals. But in 2006, the California Supreme
Court ruled that §230 protects all non-authors who republish content, not just formal intermediaries like ISPs. This
ruling—which was urged by EFF as amicus along with several
other amici—still protects ordinary bloggers and Facebook
posters in California from liability for content they merely
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republish. Unsurprisingly, the California Supreme Court’s
opinion included a four-page section dedicated entirely to
Zeran.
Another wave of attacks, also in the mid-2000s, came
as plaintiffs tried to use the Fair Housing Act to hold
intermediaries responsible when users posted housing
advertisements that violated the law. Both Craigslist and
Roommates.com were sued over discriminatory housing
advertisements posted by their users. The Seventh Circuit,
at the urging of EFF and other amici, held that §230 immunized Craigslist from liability for classified ads posted by
its users—citing Zeran first in a long line of cases supporting broad intermediary immunity. Despite our best efforts,
however, the Ninth Circuit found that §230 did not immunize Roommates.com from liability if, indeed, it was subject
to the law. The majority opinion ignored both us and
Zeran, citing the case only once in a footnote responding
to the strong dissent. It found that Roommates.com could
be at least partially responsible for the development of the
ads because it had forced its users to fill out a questionnaire about housing preferences that included options that
the plaintiffs asserted were illegal. The website endured
four more years of needless litigation before the Ninth
Circuit ultimately found that it hadn’t actually violated any
anti-discrimination laws at all, even with the questionnaire.
The court left its earlier opinion intact, however, and we
were worried the exception carved out in Roommates.com
would wreak havoc on §230’s protections. It luckily hasn’t
been applied broadly by other courts—undoubtedly thanks
in large part to Zeran’s stronger legal analysis and influence.

The Fight Continues
We are now squarely in the middle of a fourth wave
of attack—efforts to hold intermediaries responsible for
extremist or illegal online content. The goal, again, seems
to be forcing intermediaries to actively screen users and
censor speech. Many of these efforts are motivated by
noble intentions, and the speech at issue is often horrible,
but these efforts also risk devastating the Internet as we
know it.
Some of the recent attacks on §230 have been made
in the courts. So far, they have not been successful. In
these cases, plaintiffs are seeking to hold social media
platforms accountable on the theory that providing a
platform for extremist content counts as material support
for terrorism. Courts across the country have universally
rejected these efforts. The Ninth Circuit will be hearing
one of these cases, Twitter v. Fields, in December.
But the current attacks are unfortunately not only in
the courts. The more dangerous threats are in Congress.
Both the House and Senate are considering bills that
would exempt charges under federal and state criminal
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and civil laws related to sex trafficking from §230’s protections—the Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (S. 1693)
(SESTA) in the Senate, and the Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (H.R. 1865) in the House.
While the legislators backing these laws are largely well
meaning, and while these laws are presented as targeting commercial classified ads websites like Backpage.
com, they don’t stop there. Instead, SESTA and its house
counterpart punish small businesses that just want to run
a forum where people can connect and communicate. They
will have disastrous consequences for community bulletin
boards and comment sections, without making a dent in
sex trafficking. In fact, it is already a federal criminal offense for a website to run ads that support sex trafficking,
and §230 doesn’t protect against prosecutions for violations of federal criminal laws.
Ultimately, SESTA and its house counterpart would
impact all platforms that host user speech, big and small,
commercial and noncommercial. They would also impact
any intermediary in the chain of online content distribution, including ISPs, web hosting companies, websites,
search engines, email and text messaging providers, and
social media platforms—i.e., the platforms that people
around the world rely on to communicate and learn every
day. All of these companies come into contact with user-generated content: ads, emails, text messages, social
media posts. Under these bills, if any of this user-generated content somehow related to sex trafficking, even
without the platform’s knowledge, the platform could be
held liable.
Zeran’s analysis from 20 years ago demonstrates why
this is a huge problem. Because these bills would have
far-reaching implications—just as every other legislative
proposal for limiting §230—they would open Internet intermediaries, companies, nonprofits, and community supported endeavors alike to massive legal exposure. Under this
cloud of legal uncertainty, new websites, along with their
investors, would be wary of hosting open platforms for
speech—or of even starting up in the first place—for fear
that they would face crippling lawsuits if third parties used
their websites for illegal conduct. They would have to bear
litigation costs even if they were completely exonerated,
as Roommates.com was after many years. Small platforms that already exist could easily go bankrupt trying
to defend against these lawsuits, leaving only larger ones.
And the companies that remained would be pressured to
over-censor content in order to proactively avoid being
drawn into a lawsuit.
EFF is concerned not only because this would chill new
innovation and drive smaller players out of the market. Ultimately, these bills would shrink the spaces online where
ordinary people can express themselves, with disastrous
results for community bulletin boards and local newspa-
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pers’ comment sections. They threaten to transform the
relatively open Internet of today into a closed, limited,
censored Internet. This is the very result that §230 was
designed to prevent.
Since Zeran, the courts have recognized that without
strong §230 protections, the promise of the Internet as
a great leveler—amplifying and empowering voices that
have never been heard, and allowing ideas to be judged
on their merits rather than on the deep pockets of those
behind them—will be lost. Congress needs to abandon its
misguided efforts to undermine §230 and heed Zeran’s
time-tested lesson: if we fail to protect intermediaries, we
fail to protect online speech for everyone.

Zeran v. AOL
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How the Supreme Court
Ignored the Lesson of
‘Zeran’ and Screwed Up
Copyright Law on the
Internet
Roger Allan Ford discusses the problem with
Congress and the courts not extending the
‘Zeran v. AOL’ decision for defamation to its
copyright counterparts.

Roger Allan Ford is Associate Professor of Law at the University of New
Hampshire School of Law and Faculty Fellow at the Franklin Pierce Center
for Intellectual Property. Thanks to Alexandra Roberts, Ann Bartow, Eric
Goldman, Jeff Kosseff, Jennifer Berk, John Greabe, Keith Winstein, Leah
Plunkett, and Ryan Vacca for comments on a previous draft.

By Roger Allan Ford

T

wenty years ago, a federal appeals court said
Kenneth Zeran couldn’t sue AOL for failing to
remove defamatory posts. It is no exaggeration to
say that had the court gone the other way, much
of today’s Internet could not exist in its modern
form. But when the issue is copyright instead of defamation, Congress and the courts have resisted this lesson;
instead of nurturing new industries, they’ve snuffed them
out. And just as it was impossible to guess in 1997 the many
platforms, tools, and communities that would emerge after
the Zeran v. AOL decision, it is impossible to know now how
many innovative industries will never emerge due to its
copyright counterparts.
Zeran answered a critical question for online services:
If a user posts something that’s defamatory, and so violates the law, is the service liable? It’s easy to see why the
answer must be no. An online community like AOL doesn’t
work without content contributed by users; without that
content there is no community. That was true in 1997, and
it is even truer today, when content generated by users
underlies all kinds of online services. But if a company had
to police every piece of user-generated content or, worse,
were liable every time a user went too far, it would be
impossible to run online services at scale. Facebook and
YouTube couldn’t vet each post for defamation liability;
certainly a 10-person startup couldn’t do so.
So Zeran made it possible for online services to exist

without incurring crippling liability. And that led to a surge of
services that billions of users rely on, an explosion the scale
and breadth of which the court could not have imagined in
1997. Some of these services are straightforward descendants
of AOL and its contemporaries: discussion forums, search engines, and blogging platforms all resemble tools that existed
in 1997. Others were less foreseeable. Social networks and
online video existed in 1997, but the sheer variety and scope
of platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Snapchat would
surprise someone from 1997; likewise, tools like Wikipedia,
Genius, and Adblock Plus, which rely on content contributed
by users, had few parallels when Zeran was decided.
Zeran’s rule of limited liability was a public-policy success
because it created free space in which whole industries could
develop. The same cannot be said of copyright policy on the
Internet; if Zeran had sued AOL for failing to take down copyrighted content instead of defamatory content, he probably
would have won. So new business models that involve copyrighted content are at much greater risk than those involving
other kinds of user-generated content.
Take the case of Aereo, a service that let users watch
broadcast TV on the Internet. Courts had long held that
consumers can legally copy works for space-shifting and
time-shifting, so they can watch and listen to video and music
at different times on different devices. This is what iPods and
DVRs do, and it’s also what Aereo promised to let users do.
Aereo set up individual, dime-sized antennas for users so they
could record and stream broadcast TV channels. This system
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was just a remote DVR: instead of recording shows onto a
hard drive in her home, a user could outsource that function
to Aereo, just as she might outsource email or file storage
to an online service. And so the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that what Aereo did was legal, just
like any other DVR would be.
The Supreme Court disagreed, in a funhouse mirror
image of Zeran that destroyed innovation instead of encouraging it. The court noted that Aereo marketed itself as
a replacement for cable TV and reasoned that since cable
companies “perform the copyrighted work[s] publicly” when
they transmit them to subscribers, Aereo must do so as
well. It didn’t matter that Aereo’s transmissions were triggered by users, not Aereo itself, or that each user recorded
and transmitted her own copy from her own antenna, or
that the transmissions were available only to the user, not
to the broader public. Instead of analyzing these key distinguishing features of the Aereo system, the court adopted
what Justice Antonin Scalia, in dissent, called a “looks-likecable-TV” test: if a company creates a new business model
that competes with an incumbent technology, courts should
bend the law to apply the same copyright rules to each. So
while in Zeran the court took a narrow view of the plaintiff’s
rights, requiring him to sue the people who posted defamatory content instead of the platform hosting that content,
in Aereo it took the broadest possible view of the plaintiff’s
rights.
Did the Aereo decision actually prevent any innovation?
It’s impossible to tell for sure, but there are all sorts of
possible business models that would run afoul of the court’s
rule. One big contender would be a service to solve fragmentation in video streaming. When all TV was broadcast
over the air, people could buy any TV set and pick up any
show on any channel. As video moves online, though, there
is no streaming service that has every show and no box that
can run every streaming service. Instead of just changing
the channel, today a user might have to skip a show if she
doesn’t have a box that can play it. It’s easy to imagine a

Page 2

service, then, that could tune in and stream video from
any service to a custom app or a web browser—effectively,
space-shifting for streaming services. But under Aereo,
that service is probably illegal. The result is that incumbent
rights-holders can veto new businesses that might threaten
their incumbency, a power they have been happy to exercise.
Copyright holders have long used their copyright monopoly—legally—to prevent competition, but they have been
constrained by limitations like the first-sale doctrine. Back
when Blockbuster Video was the state of the art in watching movies, studios couldn’t stop stores from renting them,
since the law blocks a copyright holder from restricting
what someone does with a copy after it has been sold. But
the shift to online business models has upset this balance
between creators and others using those creations, since
online streaming inherently creates copies and so isn’t subject to the first-sale doctrine.
The Aereo court could have helped restore the balance
between creation and competition by limiting rights-holders’
powers, letting people use online services to do the same
things they have long been able to do offline. This would
have encouraged entrepreneurs to create valuable new
businesses and services, just as the Zeran decision did two
decades earlier. Instead, the court went the other way. The
fault may lie more with Congress than with the courts, since
in Zeran, Congress had created an express immunity for
businesses relying on user-generated content; Congress’s
similar immunity for copyrighted content, a safe-harbor rule
that applies when sites have notice and take down allegedly
infringing content, is much more limited. Still, there is a long
history in copyright law of technologies that look like pirates
at first but eventually become respected businesses; recorded music, the VCR, even sheet music were all at one point
seen as threats to rights holders. Congress and the courts
should keep the Zeran lesson in mind before backing away
from that history and preemptively killing off the online
services of tomorrow.
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Moral Hazard on Stilts:
‘Zeran’s’ Legacy
The Internet today is awash in threats,
harassment, defamation, and conspiracy
theories which disproportionately burden
vulnerable citizens, while the websites,
platforms, and ISPs that make it possible are
protected from harm.
By Mary Anne Franks

L

ess than a week after the 1995 Oklahoma City
bombing that left 168 people dead, Kenneth Zeran
began receiving threatening phone calls at his
home. He soon discovered the reason: without
Zeran’s knowledge, an anonymous hoaxer had
posted a message on an America Online (AOL) bulletin
board advertising t-shirts and other paraphernalia glorifying the attack, providing Zeran’s home phone number
for interested buyers to call. Although AOL complied with
Zeran’s request that the message be removed, new messages with similar content continued to be posted to the site.
At one point, Zeran was receiving threatening calls every
two minutes. After an Oklahoma City radio station read the
slogans on air and urged listeners to call Zeran, the phone
calls became so threatening that Zeran’s house was placed
under protective surveillance.
Zeran sued AOL for negligence, arguing that the company
had failed to respond appropriately after being made aware
of the nature of the posts. The case eventually made its way
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held
that Zeran’s claim was preempted by §230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). In reaching its decision, the court
asserted that “Congress’ clear objective in passing §230 of
the CDA was to encourage the development of technologies,
procedures and techniques by which objectionable material could be blocked or deleted,” and holding AOL liable as
a distributor for offensive content would conflict with this
objective. The court reasoned that the possibility of distributor liability, which applies when a distributor is aware of the
unlawful nature of the content, would prompt intermediaries
like AOL to refrain from monitoring content at all.
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In effect, the court held that entities such as AOL could
not be held liable for being nonresponsive to unlawful content
because doing so would encourage them to be nonresponsive
to unlawful content. The court ignored the obvious point that
Zeran’s experience suggested that online intermediaries were
already insufficiently motivated to address unlawful content.
The court provided no evidence for the claim that distributor
liability would make them more so, and failed to recognize
that taking distributor liability for websites and ISP off the
table in fact “has the effect of discouraging self-policing of
content,”[1] contrary to the goal the court itself cited. As one
commentator describes it, “[w]ebsites and ISPs know that no
matter how inflammatory third-party postings are, complaints
from aggrieved parties will be to no avail, even after notice to
the website or ISP.”[2]
In economics, the lack of incentive to guard against risk
where one is protected from its consequences is known as a
“moral hazard.” Zeran’s interpretation of §230 (c)(1), which
states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider” creates
a clear moral hazard. Twenty years on, there is no evidence
that broad immunity from liability has done anything more
than encourage websites and ISPs to be increasingly reckless
with regard to abusive and unlawful content on their platforms.
Today, the Internet is awash in threats, harassment, defamation,
revenge porn, propaganda, misinformation, and conspiracy
theories, which disproportionately burden vulnerable private
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citizens including women, racial and religious minorities, and
the LGBT community. They are the ones who suffer while the
websites, platforms, and ISPs that make it possible for these
abuses to flourish are protected from harm.
The moral hazard created by protecting interactive
computer service providers from liability, even when they
knowingly feature, aggregate, and distribute unlawful
content, is compounded by the increasing corporate domination of the Internet. Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google,
and Microsoft are now the five largest firms in the world
based on market value, and they exert outsized influence
on Internet communication and commerce. The corporate
structure itself creates its own moral hazard: “the nature of
corporate action, where bureaucracy dictates that most of
the actors are far removed from the actual harm that might
occur as a result of their decisions, increases the likelihood
of egregious conduct.”[3] The corporations that exert
near-monopoly control of the Internet are thus doubly protected from the costs of their risky ventures even as they
reap the benefits. The dominant business model of websites
and social media services is based on advertising revenue,
and “abusive posts still bring in considerable ad revenue…
the more content that is posted, good or bad, the more ad
money goes into their coffers.” As Astra Taylor writes in The
People’s Platform, these Internet entities are “commercial
enterprises designed to maximize revenue, not defend political expression, preserve our collective heritage, or facilitate creativity.”[4] As currently interpreted, §230 provides
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virtually no way to hold these increasingly powerful entities
accountable for the harm they cause.
In a footnote, the Zeran court writes that the “CDA reflects Congress’ attempt to strike the right balance between
the competing objectives of encouraging the growth of the
Internet on one hand, and minimizing the possibility of harm
from the abuse of that technology on the other.” While the
court reiterates that Congress has the right to decide how
to fulfill its own purposes, it notes “today’s problems may
soon be obsolete while tomorrow’s challenges are, as yet,
unknowable. In this environment, Congress is likely to have
reasons and opportunities to revisit the balance struck in
CDA.” Twenty years of moral hazards might be enough.
Endnotes:
[1] David Lukmire, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act?: The Reverberations of ‘Zeran v. America Online,’ 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 371, 403 (2010)
[2] Id.
[3] David Niose, Fighting Back the Right: Reclaiming
America from the Attack on Reason (2014), 45
[4] Astra Taylor, The People’s Platform: Taking Back
Power and Culture in the Digital Age (2014) 221.
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The Possible Redundancy
of §230
Both fans and foes of Zeran assume that its
interpretation of §230 changed the scope
of liability for ISPs under the common law
republication rule. Author Brian L. Frye isn’t so
sure.
By Brian L. Frye

W

hile hard cases often make bad law, occasionally they also make good law, often by
accident. And few cases are harder or made
better law than Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
(4th Cir. 1997), in which the court held that
§230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)
exempts internet service providers (ISPs) from liability for
statements made by third parties.
Many commentators believe Zeran “saved the internet”
by enabling ISPs to permit unfiltered speech. But others
argue Zeran misinterpreted §230, which was intended to
encourage ISPs to filter speech. I think Zeran reached the
right result, whatever Congress intended §230 to accomplish,
because AOL wasn’t liable under the common law rule, either.
Both fans and foes of Zeran assume that its interpretation of §230 changed the scope of liability for ISPs under the
common law republication rule. I’m not so sure. While §230
requires courts to use different words than the common law
rule, the Zeran interpretation of §230 produces essentially
the same results as the common law rule, properly applied.

The Common Law of Libel & the
Republication Rule
Under the common law, a person who publishes a false
and defamatory statement is liable for libel. The First Amendment sets a standard of fault of “actual malice” for statements about “public figures” and “negligence” for statements of “public concern” about “private figures.” And the
“republication rule” provides that a person who knowingly
or recklessly disseminates a libelous statement attributed to
a third party is also liable for libel. Under the republication
rule, “publishers” (e.g., newspapers) are liable because they
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necessarily know the content of a statement they publish,
“distributors” (e.g., newsstands) are liable only if they know or
should have known about the libelous content of a statement
they distribute, and “conduits” (e.g., mail carriers) are not
liable because they cannot know the content of a statement
they deliver.

The Road to Zeran
Initially, courts simply applied the republication rule to libel claims against ISPs acting as intermediaries. Some courts
held that ISPs were “distributors,” because they did not
exercise editorial control over third-party statements. But in
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy (N.Y. Sup. 1995), a New York trial
court held that an ISP was a “publisher,” because it exercised
some editorial control over third-party statements posted to
a “bulletin board.” Congress enacted §230 explicitly in order
to overrule Stratton Oakmont, providing that an ISP is not the
“publisher” of “any information provided by another information content provider,” even if it filters that information.
In 1995, an anonymous AOL subscriber purporting to
be Kenneth Zeran advertised offensive T-shirts on an AOL
bulletin board. Zeran asked AOL to remove the posts, and it
complied. But in 1996, Zeran filed a libel action against AOL,
arguing that it was liable as a distributor because it knew
about the defamatory posts. The district court granted AOL’s
motion to dismiss on the pleadings and the 4th Circuit affirmed, holding that §230 exempted AOL from liability for all
statements made by third parties.
The Zeran court explained that under the republication
rule, anyone who disseminates a libelous statement is a “pub-
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lisher” of that statement:
The simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one
from an original publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the
law. To the contrary, once a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust
into the role of a traditional publisher.
The court also observed that treating ISPs as “distributors” would impose potential notice-based liability, and
create “a natural incentive simply to remove messages upon
notification, whether the contents were defamatory or not,”
thereby chilling speech.

Section 230 v. the Republication Rule
Zeran encouraged the development of social media by
enabling ISPs to refrain from filtering speech, without fear
of liability. But critics argued that it interpreted §230 too
broadly, and improperly granted ISPs special protection
against libel claims. The combination of §230 and Zeran
certainly created a liability rule unique to ISPs. Rather than
apply the republication rule, courts effectively ask whether
ISPs are acting as speakers or intermediaries.
But Zeran also precluded courts from simply adapting
the republication rule to ISPs. In theory, the republication
rule applies to any dissemination of a libelous statement
made by a third party, irrespective of the context in which
it is presented. But in practice, a congeries of “privileges”
and “exceptions” often preclude liability. Courts rarely find
publishers liable for libelous statements attributed to a third
party, unless the publisher knew or should have known the
statement was false. And they are even more reluctant to
find mere distributors liable.
The republication rule is sensitive to context, and the
internet is just another context. A few early cases suggest
that courts might have construed the republication rule
favorably to ISPs. A 2010 empirical study of defamation
claims against intermediaries found that §230 produced
outcomes statistically similar to the common law rule. And
some recent cases have exempted ISPs from liability for
third-party statements without applying §230. In other
words, §230 and the republication rule might have reached
a similar result by slightly different paths. The medium is
not the message.
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While Zeran purported to invoke the republication rule,
he actually asked the court to expand its scope, and the
court wisely declined. The person harassing Zeran surely
was liable for libel. But AOL was not, under §230 or the
common law rule, because it was merely a conduit, or at
most a distributor. AOL’s bulletin boards were analogous to
physical bulletin boards. No reasonable person could believe
that the owner of a bulletin board in a public place endorses
everything posted on it, and no reasonable person could believe that AOL endorsed its bulletin board postings. Owners
of public bulletin boards — whether physical or virtual — are
liable for libelous postings under the republication rule only
if they refuse to remove them, thereby implicitly adopting
the libel as their own.
The statements falsely attributed to Zeran were libelous
because distasteful, but were otherwise perfectly legal, and
could have been ads for an actual business. Zeran’s complaint was that AOL didn’t prevent their posting, or remove
them quickly enough. But the republication rule doesn’t
attribute statements to distributors without knowledge, and
doesn’t require immediate removal.
Typically, ISPs voluntarily remove libelous statements,
once they become aware of them. But it is unclear whether
§230 shields ISPs from injunctions to remove libelous material. Some courts have held it does, and others have held it
doesn’t. Under the republication rule, ISPs would surely be
liable for continuing to disseminate a third-party statement
once they know it is libelous. I find it hard to believe that
courts will ultimately construe §230 differently. At some
point, refusal to remove a libelous statement must become
an endorsement.
In addition, §230 may offer ISPs procedural advantages
over the republication rule. Under §230, actions against
ISPs are often dismissed on the pleadings, but under the
republication rule actions often proceed to trial. This could
reflect substantive differences in the facts: ISPs are typically entirely ignorant of the content of the statements they
disseminate, while the ignorance of distributors of information in other media may be more qualified. But if §230 does
offer procedural advantages on the same factual claims,
perhaps courts ought to ask why, and consider which approach to procedure is most appropriate.
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The First Hard Case: ‘Zeran
v. AOL’ and What It Can
Teach Us About Today’s Hard
Cases
They say that bad facts make bad law. What
makes ‘Zeran v. AOL’ stand as a seminal case in
§230 jurisprudence is that its bad facts didn’t.
By Cathy Gellis

T

hey say that bad facts make bad law. What makes
Zeran v. AOL stand as a seminal case in §230
jurisprudence is that its bad facts didn’t. The
Fourth Circuit wisely refused to be driven from
its principled statutory conclusion even in the
face of a compelling reason to do otherwise, and thus the
greater good was served.
Mr. Zeran’s was not the last hard case to pass through
the courts. Over the years there have been many worthy
victims who have sought redress for legally cognizable
injuries caused by others’ use of online services. And many,
like Mr. Zeran, have been unlikely to easily obtain it from the
party who actually did them the harm. In these cases courts
have been left with an apparently stark choice: compel the
Internet service provider to compensate for the harm caused
to the plaintiff by others’ use of their services, or leave the
plaintiff with potentially no remedy at all. It can be tremendously tempting to want to make someone, anyone, pay for
harm caused to the person before them. But Zeran provided
early guidance that it was possible to resist the temptation to
ignore §230’s liability limitations – and early evidence that it
was right to so resist.
Section 230 is a law that itself counsels a light touch. In
order to get the most good content on the Internet and the
least bad, Congress codified a policy that is essentially all carrot and no stick. By taking the proverbial gun away from an
online service provider’s proverbial head, Congress created
the incentive for service providers to be partners in achieving that policy goal. It did this in two complementary ways:
First, it encouraged the most beneficial content by insulating
providers for liability arising from how other people used
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their services. Second, Congress also sought to ensure there
would be the least amount of bad content online by insulating
providers from liability if they did indeed act to remove it.
By removing the threat of potentially ruinous liability, or
even just the immense cost of finding itself on the receiving
end of legal action arising from how others have used their
services, more and more service providers have been able to
come into existence and enable more and more uses of their
systems. These providers have also been able to resist unduly
censoring legitimate uses of their systems as a means of
limiting their legal risk. And by being left with the discretion
to choose what uses to allow or disallow from their systems,
service providers have been free to allocate their resources
more effectively to police undesirable use of their systems
and services than if the threat of liability instead forced them
to divert their resources in ways that might not be appropriate for their platforms, optimal, or even useful at all.
Congress could of course have addressed the developing
Internet with an alternative policy, one that was more stick
than carrot and that threatened penalties instead of offering
liability limitations, but such a law would not have met its twin
goals of encouraging the most good content and the least
bad nearly as well as §230 actually has. In fact, it likely would
have had the opposite effect, eliminating more good content

This article first appeared in the November 10, 2017 issue of The Recorder.

and missing more of the bad. The wisdom of Congress, and
of the Zeran court, was in realizing that restraint was a
better option.
The challenge we are faced with now is keeping courts,
and §230’s critics, similarly aware. The problem is that the
§230 policy balance is one that works well generally, but
not always specifically, and not always in ways people readily recognize. The reality is that people sometimes do use
Internet services in bad ways, and these uses can often be
extremely visible. What appears to be less visible, however,
is how many good uses of the Internet §230 has enabled to
be developed. In the 20-plus years since Zeran people have
moved on from AOL to countless new Internet services,
which now serve nearly 90 percent of all Americans and
billions of users worldwide. Internet access has gone from
slow modem-driven dial-up to seamless always-on broadband. We email, we tweet, we buy things, we date, we comment, we argue, we read, we research, we share what we
know, all thanks to the services made possible by §230, but
often without awareness of how much we owe to it and the
early Zeran decision upholding its tenets. We even complain
about §230 using services that §230 has enabled, and often
without any recognition of the irony.
In a sense, §230 is potentially in jeopardy of becoming
a victim of its own success. It’s easy to see when things go
wrong, but §230 has done so well creating a new normalcy
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that it’s much harder to see just how much it has allowed to
go right. Which means that when things do go wrong – as
they inevitably will, because while § 230 tries to minimize
the bad uses of online services it’s impossible to eliminate
them all—we are always at risk of letting our outrage at the
specific injustice cause us to be tempted to kill the golden
goose by upending something that on the whole has enabled so much good.
When bad things happen there is a natural urge to
clamp down, to try to seize control over a situation where
it feels like there is none. In that microcosm the hands-off
approach of §230 can seem like the wrong one, but Zeran
has shown how it is still very much the right one.
In many ways the Zeran court was ahead of its time: unlike later courts that have been able to point to the success
of the Internet to underpin their decisions upholding §230,
the Zeran court had to take a leap of faith that the policy
goals behind the statute would be born out as Congress
intended. It turned out to be a faith that was not misplaced.
Today it is hard to imagine a world without all that §230
has ushered in. But if we fail to heed the lessons of Zeran
and exercise the same restraint it did, such a world may
well be what comes to pass. As we mark 20 years since the
Zeran court affirmed §230 we need to continue to carry
its lessons forward in order to ensure that we are not also
marking its sunset and closing the door on all §230 might
yet bring.
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Who Cyber-Attacked Ken
Zeran, and Why?
More than 20 years later, it seems unlikely this
case of cyber-harassment or “e-personation”
will ever be solved.
By Eric Goldman

F

rom late April through early May of 1995, Ken Zeran was the victim of an aggressive online attack—
what we would now call a cyber-harassment or
“e-personation,” though at the time we lacked this
nomenclature. The attacker was pseudonymous,
and AOL deleted the relevant server logs (pursuant to what
AOL said was standard practice) that might have helped
reveal the attacker. (Note: for this essay I’ll assume it was
a single person and not multiple attackers, though that
too remains unknown.) Zeran sued AOL and the Oklahoma
radio station KRXO for their roles in the cyber-harassment,
but he never sued the actual perpetrator. Indeed, over two
decades later, the perpetrator remains unknown. This has
emerged as one of the greatest unsolved mysteries in internet law: who attacked Ken Zeran, and why?
As part of researching this question, I reviewed the 717page transcript of AOL defense lawyer Pat Carome deposing
Ken Zeran on Feb. 18-20, 1997. Plaintiff lawyer James Ikard
represented Zeran at the deposition. The deposition transcript of Ken Zeran was never filed with the court and is not
generally publicly available. It doesn’t answer the “whodunit”
question, but it does suggest some clues.
Let’s start with Zeran’s own appraisal of the situation in
response to Carome’s point-blank question (emphasis added):
Q: Is it your view that the person who posted the messages that you’re suing over here on AOL’s system is someone
that does not know you at all?
A: Absolutely … I believe I was picked at random.
Later in the deposition, Zeran said: “I never had the impression that this was done by somebody who knew me. I certainly, obviously wondered if there was anybody I knew who
would do this, and I don’t know anybody that would do it.”
Zeran’s hypothesis that he was a random victim isn’t com-
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pletely far-fetched. First, in 1995, anarchists and trolls already
were making random and chaos-inducing online attacks. See,
e.g., Josh Quittner, The War Between alt.tasteless and rec.
pets.cats, Wired, May 1994. Second, the Secret Service agent
investigating Zeran’s matter suggested it was a random attack. Zeran described the conversation:
[The Secret Service agent] said that—we were kind of in
agreement about the—my name being picked—my number at
random, because after asking me those questions, he came
out and said that it seemed to him my number had been
picked at random. I remember when he said that, … that sort
of confirmed my thoughts in a real positive way, that my number, in fact, had been selected randomly. And person from the
Secret Service, he’s—he seemed to be experienced about this
kind of stuff, so when he said that, you know, it sort of reconfirmed what my thoughts were.
Still, this hypothesis seems implausible. The attack on
Zeran involved multiple postings over several days, was
designed to inflict substantial damage, and involved a phone
number that would have been hard for any stranger outside
the Seattle metro area to attribute to Zeran. So let’s consider
some of the most obvious alternative explanations:
• Romantic Entanglements. At the time of the attacks,
Zeran had just started dating a new girlfriend for about six
weeks. (Note: I’ve decided not to publish the names of any
Zeran’s associates because they are unnecessary to the
discussion, and I’m not sure their names have otherwise
surfaced publicly). Around the same time, Zeran had another
woman friend who was a former romantic partner; Zeran said
“it was a casual, friendly relationship.” Maybe I’ve watched
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too many TV soap operas, but these facts set up several
possibilities. Perhaps one of the women was jealous or
upset about a possible love triangle; or perhaps one of the
women’s current or former significant others felt anger
about Zeran’s involvements.
• Competitors/Current Business Partners. Zeran worked
on several wide-ranging projects throughout his career,
including art, entertainment and real estate. At the time, in
1995, he was launching a new real estate apartment listing
resource called “The Apartment Special.” This initiative was
muscling into territory occupied by two competitors who
also published guides to apartments for rent. Perhaps one
of these competitors sought to sideline Zeran, or at least
thwart his endeavor?
Zeran was working on other projects in this timeframe
as well, including a Halloween-themed television show and
the Puget Sound Money Connection, a publication that
promoted various financial institutions. Neither project succeeded. Could the attacker have been an unhappy business
partner or competitor?
• Other Creditors. Zeran’s financial picture didn’t clear-
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ly emerge in the deposition. Ikard objected to all questions
about Zeran’s income because Zeran did not seek economic
damages. Still, it’s clear that Zeran was in the midst of several
ventures that had proven unsuccessful, and as one of the exhibits indicated, “Mr. Zeran is not a wealthy man.” Could some
creditor have attacked Zeran over unpaid debts?
• Defendants. In 1993, Zeran sued two former business
associates, claiming that they stole copyrighted content
from his Apartment Special television show. The case settled, but could the defendants have held a grudge?
Zeran’s diverse professional activities put him in contact with hundreds of other people over his career, and his
personal relationships surely involved hundreds more. While
the deposition transcript does not suggest any of these
people had malice towards him, such a large universe of
professional and personal contacts surely contains numerous other suspects who are at least as plausible as the truly
“random” attacker.
So who attacked Ken Zeran, and why? We still don’t
know; and after more than 20 years, it seems unlikely this
cold case will ever be solved.
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No ESC
The thrust and parry of arguments about when
online speech should stay up or come down
recapitulate well-worn arguments about when
offline speech should or shouldn’t be allowed.
By James Grimmelmann

S

ection 230 is subconstitutional free speech law.
One might naively expect it can steer clear of
the notorious complexity of First Amendment
law, and for the most part it does. Both arms of
§230 establish broad and simple rules. There is
no mucking about with actual malice, public versus private
figures, traditional versus limited public forums, tiers of
scrutiny, or any of the other Ptolemaic doctrinal baggage of
the First Amendment. Section 230(c)(1) avoids waking the
slumbering giant by granting immunity rather than imposing liability for speech, §230(c)(2) by giving private actors
rather than state actors a privilege to block speech on their
platforms.
Even so, debates about §230’s reach have an oddly familiar ring to them. The thrust and parry of arguments about
when online speech should stay up or come down recapitulate well-worn arguments about when offline speech should
or shouldn’t be allowed. There are, I think, three things going
on. One is that §230 itself is always open to challenge. It may
be good law, but that doesn’t tell us whether it’s a good law.
The second is that even though §230’s protection is absolute
and its coverage broad, its coverage still has limits (as any
law’s must). Some of those limits look a lot like the limits on
the scope of “speech” under the First Amendment. And the
third is that §230 by design gives platforms substantial freedom to allow speech or to restrict it. In choosing how to exercise that freedom, they have to confront the same conflicts
that animate First Amendment doctrine. All three of these
open the door to the kinds of arguments that one regularly
sees in First Amendment cases and free speech debates.
Speech vs. conduct. The line between “speech” and
conduct” in First Amendment doctrine is contested, and so
is the corresponding line in §230 between “information” or
“material” of which one can be the “publisher or speaker”
and everything else. Some plaintiffs try to plead out of 230
by arguing that failing to supervise sex traffickers, or provid-
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ing service to terrorists, is conduct rather than speech. And
some sharing-economy platforms like AirBnB try to plead into
§230 by arguing that they provide a forum for users to speak
(albeit in ways that often lead to transactions).
Hate speech and harassment. When do hate speech
against groups and harassing speech against individuals go
too far? Different countries answer the question in different
ways — and so do different platforms. Those arguing for tighter crackdowns make familiar claims about threats, coordinated attacks, psychological abuse, and expressive harms. Those
arguing against make equally familiar claims about political
speech, counter-speech, chilling effects, and excessive sensitivity.
Intellectual property. Section 230, for better or worse,
carves out from its preemption “any law pertaining to intellectual property.” But for better or worse, the First Amendment also gives special deference to IP laws. The result is that
invoking IP—particularly copyright—is a common plaintiffs’ tactic for avoiding §230. Some of this is boundary work: the IP
fields have their own frameworks for dealing with secondary
liability (e.g., §512). But there is also an interesting subconstitutional leveling taking place within IP: recent expansions in
fair use are equally available to online and offline defendants.
Rules vs. standards. Very few platforms protected by
§230 allow all of the speech they legally could. But policies
distinguishing between permissible and impermissible speech
(e.g. spam vs. ham), and policies backed up with sanctions
(e.g., account deletion) raise familiar jurisprudential problems. In First Amendment terms, platforms and their critics
worry about overbreadth, underinclusion, vagueness, and
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discriminatory enforcement. Case in point: Twitter’s endless
struggle to develop a workable harassment and hate speech
policy and make it stick.
Contemporary community standards. The Internet’s
breakdown of geographic barriers challenges the First
Amendment’s reliance on local community norms to
define obscenity. Section 230(e)(1) specifically defers to
federal obscenity laws, so online platforms have to live
with that uncertainty. But even if they didn’t, the same
problem recurs one level down: how much should a platform allow for diverse and conflicting local norms about
acceptable freedom of expression? Consider Reddit’s
repeated near-meltdowns over the antics of “problematic” subreddits like r/creepshots and r/TheDonald. Any
sufficiently large and diverse platform must confront
Godel’s Theorem of Liberalism: no social system can be
both consistent and completely tolerant.
State action. One of the most important moving parts
in the standard defense of strong First Amendment protections for noxious speech is that individuals can avoid most
of it in practice because private actors are free to speak,
listen, and convey speech as they choose. The state-action,
public-forum doctrine, and government-speech doctrines
may be confused and confusing, but they draw a crucial
legal and normative line. Even if Internet platforms are
currently clearly private for First Amendment purposes,
they often regard themselves as having a responsibility to
behave responsibly, which they define in ways that rely on
traditionally public rule-of-law virtues like availability to all,
neutrality, fair notice, and consistency.
Platform speech. Platforms are always ambivalent about
the speech they carry: they want to be praised (and sometimes paid) for it, but they also don’t want to blamed for it.
In the First Amendment context, every medium presents the
issue of when a platform for others’ speech itself “speaks,”
with all the attendant rights and responsibilities. Section
230(c)(1) allows platforms to be extraordinarily handsoff; §230(c)(2) lets them be extraordinarily hands-on; the
combination of the two lets them be anywhere in between.
Plaintiffs sometimes try to argue that one choice or another
gives a platform an obligation to allow their speech or to
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remove someone else’s. These arguments usually fail — but
there is a line here, and there has to be, because §230 by its
very nature distinguishes between first-party and third-party speech. Perhaps the Roommates.com “contributes materially to the alleged illegality” test is messy for the same
reasons that the First Amendment government-speech
cases are messy.
Jurisdiction. Free speech issues are global, and different
countries have different free speech norms. Anyone who
speaks in a way accessible to people in more than one country has to contend with the differences. This is a context in
which §230 may not make much of a difference. Any platform with an international reach is going to have to contend
with other countries’ more restrictive laws anyway, and
those countries may not much care whether American free
speech law acts at the constitutional or statutory level. The
most important piece of the puzzle here may actually be the
SPEECH Act, which explicitly incorporates §230 in making it
hard to enforce foreign defamation judgments in the United
States — helping give local American platforms the ability
simply to ignore what other countries have to say.
***
Section 230, everyone agrees, singles out online speech
for special solicitude. One dimension of this solicitude is
familiar. By protecting online speech more robustly than
offline speech, §230 is an example of what Eric Goldman
calls “Internet exceptionalism.” Zeran confirmed that online
speech intermediaries would be shielded from liability
in cases where their offline counterparts would not, and
much of the debate around §230 is over the wisdom of
this choice. (Personally, I agree with Felix Wu: the risks of
collateral censorship on Internet-scale platforms are serious
enough that this special immunity is usually justified.
But at the risk of stating the obvious, the other half of
the term also matters. Section 230 protects online speech,
yes, but it also protects online speech. It is the 21st-century
First Amendment. Like any true heir, it has received a great
deal from its predecessor: not just the family fortune, but
the family feuds as well.
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The Satellite Has No
Conscience: §230 in a World
of ‘Alternative Facts’
Section 230 of the CDA continues to be the
right policy choice, but it is up to us to be critical
readers, calling out untruths, highlighting and
promoting that which is reliable and discrediting
that which is not.
By Laura A. Heymann

T

wenty-one years after the enactment of the
Communications Decency Act, from which §230
survived, and 20 years after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Zeran
v. AOL, which set the standard by which §230
was to be interpreted, an increasing number of voices are
questioning §230’s scope. The concerns that motivated
§230—balancing the flourishing of the Internet against the
very real likelihood that some participants would use it for
socially undesirable, hateful, or threatening behavior—continue to be relevant today. Indeed, what seems to be a rise
in hate speech, false information, and threatening behavior has suggested to some that the balance that Congress
struck, and that the Fourth Circuit validated, should be
reconsidered.
Section 230 states that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider” and that “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable” on account of any
good faith, voluntary actions to restrict access to material
that the provider or user considers to be objectionable. In
short, service providers may either publish the material of
others or remove the material of others without risk of liability as a publisher or speaker of that material. The assumption
is that without such protections, and given the vast amount
of user-generated content on the Internet, providers will
blindly delete any material claimed to be objectionable rather
than risk liability for making the wrong judgment. Section
230 received its first major test when Kenneth Zeran sued
America Online, seeking recompense for the harassment he
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suffered when unknown parties reacted to a false posting on
the service claiming that a “Ken” at his business telephone
number was selling offensive T-shirts relating to the Oklahoma City bombing. The Fourth Circuit interpreted §230 to bar
liability, given that AOL was not the author of the posting
and despite AOL’s reported inaction in the face of Zeran’s
requests to immediately remove the posting. (Disclosure: I
served as in-house counsel at America Online for three years
in the early 2000s.)
The events in Charlottesville, Virginia, on Aug. 12 provide
a sobering moment to re-engage with these concerns. Some
platform providers have since taken a more active role regarding hateful content on their services (with some deciding
to cease providing service altogether to white supremacist
groups and other hate groups), while some third parties, in
a replay of what befell Kenneth Zeran, publicly misidentified
participants in the aftermath of the march, leading to harassment and threats—all activities that, absent §230, could
have given rise to service provider liability. These scenarios
are further complicated by the fact that, as with the poster
in Zeran’s case, the authors of the problematic content may
remain forever unknown to those harmed, either because the
injured party would not be able to satisfy the legal process
courts typically require to disclose user identity information
or because of incomplete recordkeeping on the part of the
service provider. The combination of these two limitations,
some might say, creates an even greater likelihood of bad
behavior: service providers freed de jure from the specter of
liability and users freed de facto from responsibility for their
activity.
Yet §230 continues to be, I believe, the right policy
choice. As a result of §230, millions of individuals can communicate with the world virtually instantaneously, without
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supervision, editing, or permission. Section 230 gives us a
world that provides hundreds of book, film, and restaurant
reviews; warns us about unscrupulous businesses; gives us
first-hand reporting from war zones and disaster areas; and
helps us to understand the plight of individuals who would
not feel comfortable sharing their stories through intermediaries. We have moved from a world in which there were
fewer content producers and relatively more distributors to
a world in which we have many online authors and relatively
fewer online distributors. Absent §230, a service provider
would be put in the position of a newsstand with an endless
supply of unknown publishers seeking to have their papers
put out for sale. The scale alone would require any reasonable distributor to turn almost all of them away.
This means, for better or for worse, that more of the
work on the Internet must be done by us. We cannot rely on
an imprimatur of a newspaper publisher or a broadcast television network for much of the information we read online.
We must be critical readers, calling out untruths, highlighting and promoting that which is reliable and discrediting
that which is not. (Threats or other criminal behavior
should, of course, be reported to and investigated by appropriate authorities.) We must reject information dressed
up in the validation of look and feel and recognize that
speed sometimes comes at the cost of truth. These are all
responsibilities that Congress anticipated in enacting §230
by including in its findings its belief that the better policy is
to leave control over the information they receive primarily
in the hands of users so as to preserve the possibility of
“true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity” with “a minimum of government regulation.”
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Zeran recognized that these
findings were not simply rhetorical preamble but part and
parcel of §230’s existence.
I say all of this this knowing that, as Kenneth Zeran
discovered, we are often porous filters of information conveyed via the Internet, whether through inability, inexperience, inertia, or ignorance. The fourth player in Zeran’s
story was KRXO Radio in Oklahoma City. Mark Fullerton,
who co-hosted a morning drive-time radio show under the
name Mark Shannon, was reportedly known for his “caustic
observations” and “ridicule of his verbal targets;” he delighted in the “heated opinions” he fomented. Shannon saw
the AOL posting when a listener unknown to him forwarded
it to him. He tried to e-mail “Ken” at the AOL screen name
in the posting and discovered that the screen name was
inactive. He decided not to call the telephone number in the
posting because it was before business hours. Despite this
complete lack of vetting, Shannon read parts of the post on
air and encouraged listeners to call the number and “let the
seller know what Oklahomans thought of him.” (During his
deposition, Shannon acknowledged that had he talked to
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Zeran before the broadcast, he would not have broadcast
the phone number.)
Kenneth Zeran sued Diamond Broadcasting, the radio
station’s parent company, in a separate action in which, of
course, §230 was not available to the defendant. Nevertheless, every claim was dismissed. Zeran, the court held,
could not succeed on a defamation claim because he could
not show that his reputation had been sullied. (No one
who knew him heard the broadcast, and no one who heard
the broadcast knew him.) He could not succeed on a false
light claim or a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the radio station’s employees had been
careless but not reckless or intentionally tortious. An onair apology was apparently Kenneth Zeran’s total redress.
(Mark Shannon, for his part, was fired in December 1999
from a later broadcasting position, reportedly for a producer’s offensive on-air comment about the Texas A&M bonfire
tragedy that killed 12 students. The Oklahoman reportedly
closed reader comments on the article about Shannon’s
death in 2010 because of the offensive nature of some of
the remarks.)
Kenneth Zeran’s story was rewritten largely because
he pursued litigation. Although he lost his lawsuits against
both AOL and Diamond Broadcasting, the opinions in those
cases, and the publicity that surrounded them, confirmed
for any reasonable reader that he was not the “Ken” of the
posting on AOL and was, instead, the victim of a cruel hoax.
But §230 had not then been tested, and filing today what
we would now recognize as meritless litigation against a
service provider cannot be the means of historical correction. So the burden is on us, as readers, to do better. As
scholar Cathy Davidson writes, we must teach others “to
be hypervigilant about veracity, analysis, critical thinking,
historical depth, subterfuge, privacy, security, deception,
manipulation, logic, and sound interpretation.” We should
encourage service providers to consider the implications
of their content policies. And we should engage in these
efforts publicly, so that the Kenneth Zerans of the world can
have the record, if not fully corrected, at least significantly
amended.
This undertaking can sometimes seem, admittedly, like
rowing against the current. What we should not do, however, is jettison the statute that almost certainly has kept the
Internet as we now know it afloat, even as we know that this
will bring both harms and benefits. Indeed, although these
are incredibly difficult and, for the individuals involved,
painful problems, they are not new ones. Section 230 was a
response to the medium, not to the message. In his last public speech, in 1964, Edward R. Murrow said, “The speed of
communications is wondrous to behold. It is also true that
speed can multiply the distribution of information that we
know to be untrue. The most sophisticated satellite has no
conscience. The newest computer can merely compound, at
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speed, the oldest problem in the relations between human
beings and, in the end, the communicator will be confronted with the old problem of what to say and how to say it.”
Section 230 recognizes that the satellite indeed has no
conscience. We do, however, and if we acknowledge that we
are better off with the satellite than without it, it falls on us
to exercise that conscience as much as we are able.

Zeran v. AOL
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The Non-Inevitable Breadth
of the ‘Zeran’ Decision
When Kenneth Zeran filed his complaint against
America Online (AOL) in April 1996, the internet
as we know it today did not exist.
By Samir C. Jain

W

hen Kenneth Zeran filed his complaint
against America Online (AOL) in April 1996,
the internet as we know it today did not
exist. Numerous services that for many
consumers are now integral to the internet—such as Google, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and eBay—
either had not yet been developed at all or were in their
infancy. At the same time, the interpretation of §230 was
an issue of first impression. Section 230 had not received
nearly the same attention as the rest of the Communications Decency Act (which itself was a single title in the
broader Telecommunications Act of 1996), either during the
legislative process or in the immediate legal aftermath, in
which a Constitutional challenge to the act’s indecency restrictions was already well on its way to the Supreme Court.
In the face of this relatively clean slate, one key strategic
consideration was how broadly to frame the case. It was not
immediately evident that Congress had enacted a far-reaching immunity in a one-sentence subsection—§230(c)(1)—in
the midst of these other more prominent provisions. Such
statutory immunity is relatively rare. By providing that “no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” had Congress intended to preempt virtually all state tort and statutory causes
of action against service providers, as well as non-criminal
federal claims, for third-party content? Would such immunity apply even when a service provider knew of the unlawful
content and intentionally chose to take no action?
At least in isolation, it was possible to construe §230(c)
(1) more narrowly. The terms “publisher or speaker” could
be interpreted in a technical sense to refer to defamation
law—libel is a published defamatory statement, while slander
is a spoken defamatory statement. Moreover, as the legislative history makes clear, a significant impetus for §230 was
overruling Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services, which had
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held a service provider potentially liable for a user’s defamatory posting. And, although Zeran’s claim was for negligence,
at bottom the case concerned allegedly defamatory content
about Zeran, and, as the Fourth Circuit recognized, the label
attached to the claim should not be determinative. Thus, the
core of the case could have simply been that, because publication is an element of defamation, holding a service provider
liable for defamatory third-party content necessarily treats
it as a publisher of that content in derogation of §230. That
would have been sufficient for AOL to prevail and left the
ultimate breadth of the immunity for another day.
From the start, however, AOL understood the potential
significance of §230 to the growth and development of
the internet. Although immunity from defamation claims
for third-party content would be helpful, the specter of
other tort and statutory liability for all other claims still
would have a chilling effect on the amount and types of
content service providers might permit and create disincentives to self-regulation. Moreover, §230 clearly was
about more than defamation. Given the context, Congress
at minimum also intended to remove disincentives for
self-regulation of indecent and similarly objectionable
content. Further, the statutory exceptions for intellectual
property, privacy, and federal criminal enforcement would
have been unnecessary if the statutory immunity were
confined to defamation. Accordingly, the briefs framed the
case broadly, explaining that imposing liability on a service
provider necessarily treats it as a “publisher or speaker” of
third-party content and focusing on the statutory purposes
and the practical implications that potential liability would
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have for both free speech on the Internet and incentives
for self-regulation.
Although the district court wrote a relatively narrow
opinion in AOL’s favor “limited to the state law claim …
asserted here,” the Fourth Circuit took a more expansive
approach. Before turning to Zeran’s specific arguments, the
court described the statute in sweeping terms. In language
that was cited repeatedly in subsequent cases, the court
explained that “by its plain language, §230 creates a federal
immunity to any cause of action that would make service
providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service … lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred. And the
court proceeded to discuss in detail how broad immunity
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was necessary to fulfill the purposes of the statute.
It is fortunate that the Fourth Circuit recognized the
significance of §230 and chose to write such a defining
opinion. The facts of Zeran—while involving a sympathetic
plaintiff victimized for no apparent reason—made it easy to
see the pernicious consequences if service providers could
be held liable for third-party content. Some of the next
few cases that arose, such as Doe v. AOL and Blumenthal
v. Drudge, did not present the legal and policy issues as
cleanly. The Zeran opinion provided an anchor that moored
the decisions in those cases and many subsequent ones.
Without the Zeran opinion, on the other hand, the case law
might have evolved in a much messier way and not provided
the same certainty and assurance that has been so important in fostering the growth of so many internet services.
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The Judge Who Shaped
the Internet
The outcome in ‘Zeran v. America Online’ is not
entirely a result of the facts of the case. Section
230 caselaw might look very different today had
other judges been assigned to ‘Zeran v. America
Online’.
By Jeff Kosseff
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he conventional wisdom about §230 is that the
tech sector is lucky that Zeran v. America Online
was the first federal appellate decision to interpret the statute. By affirming the dismissal of
Ken Zeran’s lawsuit against America Online, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set a precedent
that would be difficult for other federal and state courts to
overlook. A case involving circumstances that were even
more tragic than Zeran’s might have resulted in a different
first interpretation of §230.
But the outcome in Zeran v. America Online is not entirely
a result of the facts of the case. Section 230 caselaw might look
very different today had other judges been assigned to Zeran v.
America Online. In particular, then-Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III’s authorship of the Zeran opinion was crucial.
Like other circuits, the Fourth Circuit randomly assigns
three judges to a panel that reviews briefs, hears oral arguments, and issues decisions. The three judges assigned to the
Zeran case were Donald S. Russell, a former South Carolina
governor and U.S. Senator appointed by President Nixon in
1971; North Carolina district judge Terrence Boyle, a former
assistant to Republican Sen. Jesse Helms who was sitting on
the Fourth Circuit by designation; and Wilkinson.
At first glance, Wilkinson might not appear to be the most
likely candidate to articulate robust online speech rights
that would endure for decades. Wilkinson had served in the
Reagan Justice Department, and was appointed to the Fourth
Circuit by Reagan in 1984. Overall, Wilkinson had the reputation of a reliable conservative jurist.
But there was one tidbit in his biography that might
provide some hope for the lawyers defending America Online:
before joining the Justice Department, Wilkinson was the editorial page editor of the Virginian Pilot newspaper in Norfolk.

And since joining the court, he has issued strong opinions in
favor of free speech protections that often deviate from the
rulings of other Republican appointees. In some cases, his
First Amendment views have been stronger than those of
solidly liberal jurists.
Wilkinson’s first major statement about free speech came
less than three years after he joined the Fourth Circuit. In
1986, a panel of three Fourth Circuit judges (not including
Wilkinson), affirmed a verdict against the publisher of Hustler
magazine stemming from a parody of the plaintiff, Rev. Jerry
Falwell. Hustler asked the full Fourth Circuit to review the
three-judge panel’s opinion.
The Fourth Circuit declined to rehear the case, and Wilkinson issued a blistering dissent from the denial. Hustler, he
acknowledged, is “a singularly unappealing beneficiary of First
Amendment values and serves only to remind us of the costs
a democracy must pay for its most precious privilege of open
political debate,” Wilkinson wrote. Nonetheless, he wrote, the
First Amendment prevents public figures such as Falwell from
recovering damages from a magazine due to the publication of
a parody. The panel’s opinion “surely will operate as a powerful
inhibitor of humorous and satiric commentary and ultimately affect the health and vigor of all political debate,” Wilkinson wrote.
The Supreme Court agreed with Wilkinson. Writing for a
unanimous court in 1988, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed
the panel decision.
Also in 1988, Wilkinson joined a unanimous three-judge
panel opinion that affirmed the Espionage Act conviction of
a former Navy employee who sent top-secret satellite information about Soviet naval preparations to an English defense
publication. The court’s opinion, written by Judge Russell,
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swiftly dismissed the defendant’s claims that his conviction
violated the First Amendment.
Wilkinson agreed with the ultimate outcome, but he
wrote a separate concurring opinion to stress the importance of the First Amendment, even in national security
cases. “I do not think the First Amendment interests here
are insignificant,” Wilkinson wrote. “Criminal restraints on
the disclosure of information threaten the ability of the
press to scrutinize and report on government activity. There
exists the tendency, even in a constitutional democracy,
for government to withhold reports of disquieting developments and to manage news in a fashion most favorable to
itself. Public debate, however, is diminished without access
to unfiltered facts.”
A few years later, Judge Wilkinson wrote an opinion
reversing a defamation and invasion of privacy judgment
against a trade publication brought by the subject of one of
its articles, a whistleblower who had worked at the National Cancer Institute. The court held that the whistleblower
was a public figure who, under the First Amendment, must
demonstrate that the publication acted with actual malice, a
very high standard.
“It would be ideal if the truth or falsity of every charge
could be instantly determined by the press,” Wilkinson
wrote. “Unfortunately, however, truth or falsity is often not
instantly ascertainable. In the hurly burly of political and
scientific debate, some false (or arguably false) allegations
fly. The press, however, in covering these debates, cannot be
made to warrant that every allegation that it prints is true.”
True to his newspaper roots, many of Wilkinson’s
opinions recognize the need for strong legal protections
for the media to be a watchdog of the government. For
instance, during the 1998 elections, the weekly St. Mary’s
Today newspaper in Maryland was particularly critical of
political allies of the county sheriff. On the night before the
election, off-duty sheriff’s deputies visited 40 stores and
40 news boxes and bought out the copies of the newspaper.
The newspaper sued the sheriff and other county officials,
alleging a violation of the First Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants. In a
2003 opinion, Judge Wilkinson wrote a unanimous opinion
reversing the district court.
“The incident in this case may have taken place in
America, but it belongs to a society much different and
more oppressive than our own,” Wilkinson wrote. “If we
were to sanction this conduct, we would point the way for
other state officials to stifle public criticism of their policies
and their performance.”
Unlike Wilkinson’ other free-speech cases, Zeran did not
require him to apply the First Amendment; his decision was
based entirely on his interpretation of §230. Yet Wilkinson
managed to make similarly strong pronouncements about
free speech, even when applying an obscure new communi-
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cations statute.
Wilkinson read §230 as accomplishing Congress’s broad
goal of fostering free and open online speech. “The amount
of information communicated via interactive computer
services is therefore staggering,” he wrote. “The specter of
tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have
an obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for
possible problems.”
Zeran, like Wilkinson’s other opinions, recognized a
strong free speech right. But the result was not entirely
predictable. In fact, Wilkinson’s background as a journalist
might have made him more likely to rule in favor of Zeran.
America Online was asking Wilkinson to recognize free
speech rights for Internet companies that exceeded the
protections of the First Amendment. When Wilkinson was
editorial page editor, his newspaper did not receive the
same protection for printing letters to the editor that America Online was seeking in Zeran’s case. Why should America
Online receive immunity that the Virginian Pilot does not
receive?
Still, Wilkinson continued his track record as a defender of free speech, even in a new medium. Another judge,
working from a blank slate with no other appellate court
interpretation of §230, might have adopted a much narrower view of §230. The judge could have agreed with Zeran’s
lawyers that §230 no longer immunized online services
once they received notice of illegal user content.
But once the Fourth Circuit issued Wilkinson’s opinion,
it was impossible for other judges to ignore. In some of the
early court rulings interpreting §230, judges reluctantly
immunized online services for claims arising from user
content. They cited Zeran and ultimately agreed with the
outcome, but not always with the same level of enthusiasm
as Wilkinson.
For instance, five months after the Fourth Circuit ruled
against Zeran, District of Columbia federal judge Paul L.
Friedman dismissed a defamation case against America Online filed by a former Bill Clinton aide. America Online had
provided users with access to Drudge Report, which alleged
that the aide had abused his wife. Section 230, Friedman
ruled, required him to dismiss the case. He relied heavily on
Wilkinson’s Zeran opinion, including a block quote from the
opinion of more than 250 words.
But Friedman appeared unhappy with the outcome. He
wrote that §230 is “some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement” between Congress and service providers.
“Because it has the fight to exercise editorial control
over those with whom it contracts and whose words it
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the
liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a
book store owner or library, to the liability standards applied
to a distributor,” Friedman wrote. “But Congress has made
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a different policy choice by providing immunity even where
the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.”
Had a judge who shared Friedman’s reservations about
§230 been the first to issue a binding interpretation of the
statute, the next two decades of §230 precedent—and the
landscape of the Internet—might have been quite different.
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Zeran’s Failed Lawsuit
Against an Oklahoma Radio
Station
Bodies of the victims of the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the A. P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City were still being removed from
the rubble on April 25 when an anonymous
post appeared on AOL advertising “Naughty
Oklahoma T-Shirts” for sale.
By Robert D. Nelon

B

odies of the victims of the April 19, 1995, bombing
of the A. P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City were still being removed from the rubble on
April 25 when an anonymous post appeared on
AOL advertising “Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts” for
sale. The post used the screen name “Ken ZZ03” and said
that items could be purchased by calling a Seattle phone
number and asking for “Ken.” Similar posts advertising
T-shirts and other items, from screen names “Ken ZZ033”
and “Ken Z033,” appeared during the few days following.
Each of the posts listed the same Seattle phone number
and directed a caller to “Ask for Ken.” The phone number
belonged to Ken Zeran, a Seattle resident who knew nothing about the posts.
The T-shirts being advertised bore tasteless slogans referring to the bombing (among the least offensive was “Visit
Oklahoma–It’s a Blast”). Needless to say, AOL users were appalled–more accurately, angry–at the posts. So many decided
to call “Ken” at the Seattle number and share their disgust
that the phone rang incessantly for weeks, gradually tapering
off in mid–May after local press in Oklahoma City exposed the
postings as a cruel hoax using fake AOL accounts.
Around May 1, an AOL user emailed a copy of the April 25
post to Mark Shannon, who co–hosted a morning–drive talk
show called “Shannon and Spinozi” on “classic rock” radio
station KRXO in Oklahoma City. Shannon read the post on the
air on May 1, including the Seattle phone number, and he and
Spinozi expressed their views about the crude person who
would post something so offensive online. They urged KRXO
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listeners to call the Seattle number, “ask for Ken,” and tell Ken
what they thought of him. Zeran, of course, didn’t hear the
broadcast, but he heard from lots of callers who did. Zeran
called the KRXO general manager and, after learning of the
content of the AOL post, demanded a retraction. The station
didn’t do a retraction, but during drive time on the afternoon
of May 1 and again the next morning, KRXO said that the man
at the Seattle phone number claimed he was not connected
to the AOL posts. That apparently didn’t satisfy Zeran; he
sued KRXO, owned by Diamond Broadcasting, in January
1996, four months before he sued AOL.
Zeran alleged in the suit, filed in federal court in Oklahoma City, that the KRXO broadcast about the AOL post defamed him, invaded his privacy by placing him in an offensive
false light, and intentionally inflicted emotional distress on
him. The station, of course, didn’t have a Section 230 defense,
but it moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Zeran had
failed to state a claim. The court denied the motion, saying
that the complaint “barely satisfies” the federal pleading standards. After discovery, KRXO moved for summary judgment.
The court granted the summary judgment motion (19 F.
Supp.2d 1249 (W.D. Okla. 1997)). As for Zeran’s defamation
claim, the court said it didn’t need to deal with some of the
subtleties of Oklahoma defamation law such as special damages or whether KRXO’s broadcast was “of and concerning”
Zeran that were part of KRXO’s argument; the simple fact
was that defamation law protected reputation, and the court
bought into KRXO’s argument that Zeran couldn’t identify
a single person in the world who thought less of him after
the broadcast than they did before. The false light claim fell,
too, because there was no evidence that at the time of the
broadcast Shannon or KRXO knew or recklessly disregarded
the fact the AOL post was a hoax, and Zeran’s proof of that
“actual malice” was essential to his recovery. Finally, the
intentional infliction claim was not supported by any evidence, the court said, that Shannon’s publication of the AOL
post was extreme and outrageous under the circumstances, a
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requirement for recovery of damages under Oklahoma law.
The court wrote that it sympathized with the unfortunate
events Zeran experienced, but it concluded that he had no
legal remedy against KRXO.
Zeran wasn’t satisfied with the district court’s judgment, so he appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. The appellate court was overly solicitous of
Zeran–describing him as “an accomplished artist, photographer, and film maker”–but it was no more inclined to find
him entitled to legal relief than was the district court. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of Diamond
Broadcasting (203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000)). With respect
to the defamation claim, the circuit court affirmed on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
Zeran suffered any loss of reputation; no one who heard
the broadcast or called him even knew his last name. It also
affirmed on the ground mentioned only in passing by the
district court (but that seemed to capture the attention of
the appellate panel during oral argument): that the particular kind of defamation claim asserted by Zeran–slander per
quod–required proof of special damages under Oklahoma
law, and neither emotional distress nor de minimis medical
expenses qualified.
Zeran’s false light and intentional infliction claims didn’t
pass muster, either, in the Tenth Circuit. The court affirmed
the judgment on the false light claim on the ground there was
no evidence of reckless disregard of falsity; and it rejected
Zeran’s call to employ a negligence fault standard in place of
the “actual malice” requirement adopted by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. (The Tenth Circuit declined to certify the
question to the Oklahoma court.) The appellate court concluded that there was no evidence that Shannon and Spinozi
had actual knowledge of probable falsity of the AOL post, and
the court said that such subjective actual knowledge could
not be established by the proffer of expert testimony. The
intentional infliction claim also failed, the Tenth Circuit said,
because proof of reckless disregard of falsity was required
for the IIED claim just like it was for false light. The court also
concluded that as a matter of law that Zeran’s emotional
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distress was not so severe that a reasonable person should
not be expected to endure it, a conclusion that was also fatal
to the intentional infliction claim.
The Tenth Circuit gave KRXO a small bonus on top of
affirming the judgment in its favor. The district court, saying
it did not condone Shannon’s on–air commentary, denied
an award of costs to KRXO. The station cross–appealed the
denial of its costs motion. The appellate court, while recognizing that an award of costs lies within the discretion of the
district court, concluded that in this case the lower court
had abused its discretion in denying costs because of the
court’s personal disapprobation of the defendant’s conduct.
The Tenth Circuit held “that the district court’s own view of
extra–judicial conduct, which the law does not recognize as
legally actionable, should play no part in the district court’s
decision whether to override the presumption that the prevailing party receives costs.”
The name Zeran will always be famously associated with
his case against AOL, because the seminal decision broadly
interpreting the protections of Section 230 had a universal
impact beyond the affirmance of summary judgment in
favor of KRXO in a traditional speech–based tort case under
Oklahoma law. The Diamond Broadcasting case, however,
at least for those in Oklahoma, will be remembered and
appreciated as well. The case against KRXO started before
Zeran sued AOL, and the Tenth Circuit did not render its
opinion until 26 months after the Fourth Circuit issued the
AOL opinion and nearly 19 months after the U.S. Supreme
Court denied Zeran’s petition for certiorari. Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting is often cited by Oklahoma defendants
in defamation and other cases for the helpful principles that
underlie both the district court and Tenth Circuit opinions.
In their own way, those pinpoint holdings in Diamond Broadcasting are almost as impactful as the far–reaching decision
in AOL. Zeran should be appreciated for having advanced
the law the way he did; and in a strange way, First Amendment practitioners and internet users should be thankful for
the anonymous poster who used the Oklahoma City bombing to offend us all.
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The Chilling Effect Claims in
‘Zeran v. AOL’
It is now possible to critically assess the
chilling effect claims, asserted in the Fourth
Circuit’s ‘Zeran’ decision, with more insight and
understanding than at any time previously.
By Jonathon W. Penney

I

n the two decades since it was decided, Zeran v America
Online has been extensively analyzed, criticized, assessed and re-assessed by commentators, yet one of the
Fourth Circuit’s central claims in the decision—that the
“spectre” of tort liability on the internet would have an
“obvious chilling effect”—has notably escaped more systematic study and evaluation, at least empirically. Despite the
importance of these “chilling effect” claims to the court’s
decision, this lack of empirical study is not altogether
surprising. There has been strikingly little such systematic
study of such chilling effect claims in various areas of law
over the years. Part of the problem is that chilling effects
are often subtle, difficult to measure, and require interdisciplinary research and methods going beyond traditional
legal analysis. Thus, Leslie Kendrick found in 2013, after
reviewing existing literature, that empirical support for
such chilling effect claims was “flimsy” and thus requiring
more far study.
Today, this systematic empirical study has finally begun to
take shape. Several recent studies have documented “chilling effects” in different contexts, including my own work on
surveillance related chilling effects, which received extensive
media coverage last year, as well as a more recent study,
examining the comparative dimensions of regulatory chilling
effects online, which I wrote about recently in Slate. With
these, and other recent empirical work, it is now possible to
critically assess the chilling effect claims in Zeran with more
insight and understanding than any time previously.
Drawing on this research, including new findings from my
own recently published chilling effects research paper, I argue
that the Fourth Circuit was right to raise chilling effect concerns in this context but likely wrong about how they would
arise.
Zeran was the first case wherein §230 of the Communications Decency Act was raised as a defense, and has also

Jonathon Penney is a research fellow at the Citizen Lab at the University
of Toronto and teaches law at Dalhousie University. He will be a research
affiliate at Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy starting in
fall 2017.

turned out to be the most important and influential (e.g., it
has been cited at least 1,400 times). The facts essentially
involved a case of online harassment whereby an unidentified
person posted on America Online (AOL)’s message board
false and defamatory messages about the plaintiff Kenneth
Zeran, who sued AOL for failing to remove the postings
promptly on notice.
In dismissing Zeran’s lawsuit, the Fourth Circuit made two
chilling effect claims. First, that the possibility or “spectre” of
tort liability more generally, would have an “obvious chilling
effect” as it would lead online service providers (OSPs) to
restrict speech on their services as policing “millions” of
postings for problems would be “impossible.” Second, liability
on notice would similarly have a chilling effect on internet
speech due to over-enforcement — because OSPs would be
liable only for publishing and not removal, they would have an
incentive to remove content or messages on notice, whether
defamatory or not. The court did not cite social science or
empirical research to support either assertion. And while
there were some previous studies concerning libel chill when
Zeran was decided (see Ciolli’s work for a discussion) there
were none dealing with chilling effects in online contexts.
Though these two claims are framed slightly differently—one speaks to tort liability more generally while the other
concerns liability on notice—the central point of both is that
OSPs, when faced with liability concerns arising from the
activities of users of their services, will take steps to limit
their exposure to liability by restricting those activities. Here,
this would mean restricting and limiting internet speech, thus
“chilling” it. Put succinctly, the OSP, through its liability concerns, is the main source for any chilling effects on internet
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speech.
As with many chilling effect claims, this assertion is
difficult to assess because it would involve testing counterfactuals—how does one test the proposition that but for the
broad §230 immunity for online service providers found in
Zeran there would have been a chilling effect on speech due
to OSP restrictions? Or that but for removing liability even
on notification, OSPs would have taken steps to limit and
thus chill speech?
Fortunately, recent research on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) arguably allow us to do just that. As
with the defamatory content in Zeran, OSPs in the 1990s
faced liability for copyrighted materials users posted on
their services without authorization. But rather than §230’s
blanket immunity approach to deal with this challenge,
Congress instead enacted the DMCA, which employs a notice-and-takedown system to enforce and police copyright
online. Someone who believes their copyrights are being
infringed can send a DMCA “takedown” notice to an OSP
to have the content removed. Put simply, like the liability-on-notice schemes rejected in Zeran because they would
likely lead to a “chill” on internet speech, the DMCA provides OSPs with immunity so long as they remove infringing
content promptly upon notice. In other words, the DMCA
has, in ways, created the counterfactual regulatory state of
affairs to test the chilling effect claims in Zeran.
So, is there any evidence or empirical support for the
Fourth Circuit’s chilling effects concerns? On this count,
the Fourth Circuit in Zeran was right to raise chilling effect
concerns, but was wrong to predict that OSPs would pose
the real threat to speech.
The Zeran court, as noted, was primarily concerned
about OSPs restricting speech through a “liability on
notice” regime and the “spectre” of liability it constitutes.
There is certainly some evidence on this count, but the
case is largely circumstantial. For example, there has
long been anecdotal evidence of DMCA “abuse” whereby
invalid, false or improper DMCA notices lead to content
removal online, especially as automation is increasingly
used for enforcement. Moreover, the “compliance” rate
for DMCA notices, that is, the reported rate at which an
OSP report removing content in response to notification is
fairly high at various well known and popular OSPs. Google, for example, removes websites or content either fuller
or partially in response to DMCA takedown notices in 98
percent of cases. Twitter, from January to June 2017, complied with 75 percent of DMCA notices. WordPress reports
removal in 61percent of cases. Those rates are not necessarily a problem by themselves, though when combined
with studies that have documented substantial percentages of invalid or problematic DMCA notifications — like this
2016 study by Jennifer Urban, Joe Karaganis and Brianna
Schofield finding that 30 percent of DMCA notices had
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potential problems — then these rates and anecdotal
instances may suggest OSPs are opting for removal, and
thus speech restrictions, to avoid liability. Still, there is
no “smoking gun” here, and more research would need to
be done on OSP practices to substantiate chilling effect
concerns like those of Fourth Circuit in Zeran.
But this is not the end of the story. In fact, there is reason to suspect “liability on notification” schemes can have
a noteworthy chilling effect on online activities, but the
culprit is not the OSPs receiving the notifications, but the
notifications themselves.
This is among the key findings I discuss in my new
chilling effects research paper, published earlier this year,
based on an empirical case study from my doctorate at
the University of Oxford. The study involves an original
first-of-its-kind survey, administered to over 1,200 U.S.
based adult internet users, designed to explore different
dimensions of chilling effects, threats and concerns online by comparing and analyzing participant responses to
hypothetical scenarios that, in theory, may cause chilling
effects or self-censorship. The study’s findings suggested,
among other things, that once internet users received a
personal legal notice for content they had posted online,
noteworthy percentages of internet users were less likely
to speak or write about certain things online, less likely
to share personally created content, less likely to engage
with social media, and more cautious in their internet
speech or search. In other words, there was a clear chilling effect. And among all the scenarios studied, responses suggested receiving a personal legal notice like this
would have the greatest comparative chilling effect on
people’s online activities. This is important as under the
DMCA, and similar liability-on-notice regimes, the user
posting the alleged illegal content, in addition to the OSP,
receives a copy of the legal notice. These findings offer
insights into the impact these legal notices, and the legal
threat therein, have on individual internet users.
For example, in terms of online speech, 75 percent of
respondents in the study indicated they would be “much
less likely” (40 percent) or “somewhat less likely” (35
percent) to “speak or write about certain topics online”
after receiving a personal legal notice about something
they had previously posted online. Similarly, 81 percent
of respondents indicating they “strongly agreed” (50
percent) or “somewhat agreed” (31 percent) with a statement that they would be more cautious or careful about
their online speech after receiving such a personal legal
notice. There were similar findings suggesting a chilling
effect on other activities beyond speech, including online
search, content sharing, and social network engagement.
I also found evidence of a form of indirect chilling effects
where internet users suggested they would be less likely
to speak or share when a friend in their online social
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network had received a personal legal notice for content
they had posted online.
When you combine these empirical insights as to the
impact of these “liability notifications” like DMCA (or
libel) notices with the reality that literally tens of millions of these notices are now being sent weekly due to
automation, a starker picture emerges of a substantial
and noteworthy chilling effect on internet speech, and a
range of other online activities, likely stemming from this
broader regulatory ecosystem. Moreover, the notion that
fear of legal or similar threats may “chill” online activi-
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ties is consistent with a range of recent and comparable
chilling effect studies in different contexts.
The chilling effect concerns raised in Zeran were essential to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning as they were employed
to justify rejecting alternatives to blanket immunity — like
liability on notice. Years on, in light of new empirical studies
on chilling effects, including my own, we are better situated
to assess those claims. Today, the evidence suggests that
the court’s concerns about chilling effects associated with
“liability on notification” alternatives were sound. The court
was just wrong on how they would arise.
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‘Zeran v. America Online’
and the Development of
Trolling Culture
Twenty years ago the Fourth Circuit decided
Zeran v. America Online, a decision which, on
the positive side, made possible the internet
we have today. On the negative side… it made
possible the internet we have today.
By Aaron Schwabach

‘T

he newest computer can merely compound,
at speed, the oldest problem in the relations
between human beings, and in the end the
communicator will be confronted with the
old problem, of what to say and how to say
it.’ – Edward R. Murrow, quoted by Kenneth Zeran in “The
Cultural High Road Along the Internet Landscape in The
Pursuit of Happiness,” remarks at 15th Anniversary Conference of 47 Section 230 U.S.C.(a), March 4, 2011, Santa Clara
High Tech Law Center.
Twenty years ago the Fourth Circuit decided Zeran v.
America Online, a decision which, on the positive side, made
possible the internet we have today. On the negative side…
it made possible the internet we have today. The destructive culture of incivility and trolling are not an unavoidable
consequence of a culture of near-universal online access,
but a demonstration of the enormous power of law to shape
society.
While the internet had existed in some form since the
1960s, and consumer access through Prodigy, Compuserve,
AOL, and others was already widely available in the 1980s,
the internet as a mass medium of communication did not
really catch on until the invention of the World Wide Web and
easily-usable internet browsers in the early 1990s. Human
beings being human, one of the early uses to which the new
medium was put, like all new media before it, was pornography. (Others, reflecting equally universal human values, were
gaming, shopping, and politics.)
In the United States, the ease of online access to pornography, fueled by, inter alia, Time magazine’s infamous “porn
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panic” cover–led to a demand from concerned voters that
Congress do something. What Congress did was enact the
Communications Decency Act, an idiotic piece of legislation
that ignored the Miller test for obscenity and was, in due
course, struck down by the Supreme Court.
Or mostly struck down. Section 230, protecting internet
service providers (ISPs) from some forms of liability for content posted by their users, survived and remains part of US
law to this day.
In the midst of the rapidly changing world of the 1990s
came the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19
children. The attack created universal outrage, which was
especially intense in Oklahoma City.
Beginning six days after the bombing, someone using
the name Ken ZZ03 began to post ads on AOL purporting to
be from “Ken,” offering T-shirts for sale mocking the bombing and the victims and listing Kenneth Zeran’s home phone
number. Zeran, fifteen hundred miles away in Seattle, began
to receive harassing and threatening phone calls, which intensified (from an already-high level of about one call every two
minutes) after an Oklahoma City radio station, KRXO, broadcast the content of the first posting and urged listeners to call
Zeran. Seattle police had to protect Zeran’s house.
Every year, when I teach Zeran, I ask students who they
think posted the ads. Students are always quick to suspect an
ex-lover or ex-spouse, or possibly a business rival or personal
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enemy–and eventually come to the sobering realization that
no motive was necessary: the poster might have been a
bored teenager in Stuttgart or Canberra selecting Zeran to
be the victim of a drive-by trolling. In other words, Kenneth
Zeran could be any of us; some random stranger on the
internet could decide to ruin another random stranger’s life
for no reason other than entertainment.
Of course, such conduct is both criminal and tortious.
However, locating the perpetrator may be difficult or impossible, and even if located the perpetrator may be judgment-proof or otherwise unreachable. And while the malice
of the original poster is the root cause of the harm, the
harm would have been minimal without the wider audience
provided by AOL and KRXO.
Zeran lost his suit against AOL both at trial and on appeal. The outcome is unsurprising; §230 speaks so directly
to this issue that the only surprise is that the case got as
far as it did: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content
provider,” 47 U.S.C. sec. 230(c)(1). Both the trial court and
the Fourth Circuit correctly applied the statute enacted by
Congress; however, both went through considerable agonizing in doing so, because the facts of the case were, to a
mid-1990s world not yet inured to far more horrible internet
trolling, horrific.
A single throwaway line in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion
illustrates the enormous cultural distance between the
world of 1997 and the world of 2017: “‘The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers,’ currently
used by approximately 40 million people worldwide.” Zeran,
quoting Reno. Stop and think about that for a moment:
Forty million users, out of a world population, at the time,
of nearly six billion. In 1997 roughly one person out of every
150 had access to the internet, and in almost all cases that
access was slow and cumbersome, restricted to desktops
with wired, usually dial-up, connections. The internet was
new, rare, and frightening. Today more than half of the
world’s population has internet access, and that access is
often mobile, enabling users to be constantly online. In the
developed world most people use multiple internet-connected devices on a daily basis; even in the least-connected continent–Africa–a third of the population has internet access
(more than in the United States at the time of Zeran), and
the widespread use of phone-sharing in Africa as a business
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model means that far more people probably have at least
intermittent access.
Mass internet access was a disruptive event, uprooting and replacing centuries-old industries, business models, and cultural norms. A different result in Zeran–say,
a call for legislative change followed by a Congressional
repeal of §230–would have slowed the growth of the
internet and set it on a different path. ISPs would have
had to devote resources to policing content and users,
as well as devoting funds to insure themselves against
the occasional malicious user, like Ken ZZ03, slipping
through. Countless billions of dollars of economic growth
would have been delayed or lost. The bulk of internet
development might have shifted to other countries with
their own legal equivalents of §230.
The trolling of Kenneth Zeran, as terrible as it was,
seems almost quaint in light of what has come since,
much as the online pornography–mostly slow-loading still
images–that inspired the Communications Decency Act
seems tame in comparison to the now-universal instant
availability of hardcore pornographic videos that we have
learned to accept as part of the background noise of
our information society. Trolls now email grieving family
members animated GIFs of accident victims, with cruel
messages calculated to inflict emotional distress; they
have driven emotionally vulnerable teenagers to suicide;
they have rendered huge swathes of the gaming world
unsafe for female gamers. This, too, we have learned
to accept as more background noise. We convince ourselves that Gamergate and 4chan, or their equivalents,
are simply the price of progress. Horrors that had nearly
vanished by the early 1990s, including child pornography
and Nazism, have come back. Websites devoted to hate
speech played a crucial role in the most recent presidential election and appear to have influence at the highest
levels of government. In a pre-internet, pre-Zeran world
there could never have been a President Donald Trump.
Slower, more carefully managed internet growth
might have achieved the same economic and social benefits without feeding the trolls. Zeran, though, was correctly decided; the fault lay not with the court, but with
the sodden mess of political grandstanding and sloppy
drafting that was the Communications Decency Act; in
this case, bad laws made bad facts.
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‘Zeran v. AOL’: The AntiCircumvention Tool
Zeran v. AOL is the survivalist’s kit for websites.
By Maria Crimi Speth

I

f I were an expert survivalist who was offered one tool to
survive alone in the elements, I would probably choose
a fire starter … but maybe a knife, a pot, or duct tape.
Really, I would want all of those items because no one
tool has the versatility I would want. But, for an expert in
defending website operators from against claims, choosing one tool is easy. Zeran v. AOL is the survivalist’s kit for
websites. Fortunately, lawyers almost never find ourselves
in a situation where we can only cite one case. But if that
were to happen, the Fourth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned decision in Zeran would likely be the one case I would
choose.
Ever since Congress passed 47 U.S.C. §230, a federal law
that says, “No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,”
creative lawyers have been searching for ways to circumvent
the statute and nab website owners for the bad acts of their
users. An often-made threat from attempted §230 circumventors is “this case is different.” Some assertions I often
hear as to why §230 won’t protect my client in their “unique”
situation are that his client asked for removal of the offending
content, her client’s business was destroyed, my client said
it would remove the post, my client refused to identify the
author, or my client edited the post. All of these claims were
eradicated twenty years ago in a single court decision in the
Zeran case.
The most sure-fire way to plead around §230 and at least
survive an early motion to dismiss is to allege that the service
provider is the “information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. §230
defines the information content provider as any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of the content. Early case law, including
Zeran, played a critical role in making clear that in order to be
responsible for the creation or development of the content,
the content had to originate with the service provider. “By
its plain language, §230 creates a federal immunity to any
cause of action that would make service providers liable for
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information originating with a third-party use of the service.”
Zeran at 330. Had the Fourth Circuit defined “responsible”
for the “development” in a broader fashion, that may have
changed the course of case law history. As noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008), “It’s true
that the broadest sense of the term ‘develop’ could include
the functions of an ordinary search engine — indeed, just
about any function performed by a website.” Citing the Zeran
Court’s early guidance, courts have instead adopted a far
narrower definition.
[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring not
merely to augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words,
a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls
within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167-68 (emphasis added)
As the Sixth Circuit stated in Jones v. Dirty World, 755
F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014), again citing Zeran, to define the term
development broadly “would defeat the purposes of the CDA
and swallow the core immunity that §230(c) provides for the
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions.”
When attempting to circumvent §230 in making claims
against the host of a website, a popular argument is that the
website that encourages or solicits the content is, therefore,
responsible for the development of the content. This argument evolved from a strained reading of the Ninth Circuit’s
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decision in Roommates and more directly from the Tenth’s
Circuit’s holding that a service provider is responsible for
the development of offensive content “if it in some way
specifically encourages development of what is offensive
about the content.” F.T.C. v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187,
1199 (10th Cir. 2009).
Initially, this argument got some traction. Relying on
Roommates and Accusearch, the District of Kentucky Court
adopted an encouragement test holding that:
Although Courts have stated generally that CDA immunity is broad, the weight of the authority teaches that such
immunity may be lost. That is, a website owner who intentionally encourages illegal or actionable third-party postings
to which he adds his own comments ratifying or adopting
the posts becomes a “creator” or “developer” of that content and is not entitled to immunity.
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 965 F. Supp. 2d
818, 821 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d and vacated, 755 F.3d 398 (6th
Cir. 2014).
The encouragement test did not survive appeal though.
The Sixth Circuit dealt it a death blow stating, “[w]e do not
adopt the district court’s encouragement test of immunity
under the CDA.” The Court explained that there is a crucial
distinction between the traditional publisher actions that
Zeran and other courts held were protected under §230
and actual responsibility for what makes the displayed content illegal or actionable. Jones, 755 F.3d at 414.
Playing on the definition of development, another
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popular circumvention technique is to plead that a website
operator is the information content provider because it edited the content. Here again, Zeran is the tool of choice. The
Fourth Circuit held that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional
editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.” Zeran at
330. This language laid the ground work for later cases to
hold that merely editing content does not make an interactive service provider the developer of the content and
hence the information content provider, unless the service
provider materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness of the content. Indeed, every published case that has
rejected the argument that editing, altering, modifying,
and deleting content makes the service provider an information content provider, has cited the Zeran case. See Doe
v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.N.H.
2008); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003);
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, 206 F.3d 980, 986
(10th Cir. 2000); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51
(D.D.C. 1998).
The versatility of Zeran as a tool is perhaps best illustrated through the fact that it has been cited at least 259
times by other courts. Section 230 itself has been cited 645
times, meaning that Zeran has been cited in 40 percent of
all §230 cases. So if you find yourself stranded on a virtual
island fending off enemy attacks, turn to the well-trusted
leader in protecting websites as your best survival tool.
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The UK’s Broad Rejection of
the §230 Model
When President Clinton signed the
Communication Decency Act, online
pornography—and not defamation—was the focus
of debate. However, in Reno v. American…
By Gavin Sutter

W

hen President Clinton signed the Communication Decency Act, online pornography—and
not defamation—was the focus of debate.
However, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme
Court struck down the pornography provisions, leaving
§230’s protections from liability arising from third-party
content.
On the other side of the Atlantic, however, the United
Kingdom took a very different approach to online defamation.
While the average British Parliamentarian may have had little
experience of the internet at this time (by 2000, still only
approximately one third of Westminster MPs were making use
of the email facilities provided to them), concerns were raised
about the Internet from early stages.
It would seem logical that the pronounced divergence
between US and UK law in this regard was influenced by the
context in which each first appeared: whereas Congress was
seeking to shield service providers and intermediaries with
the hope they would be emboldened to seek out pernicious
sexual content and remove it from their systems, the UK
instead saw the question of liability for third party provided
libelous content in a pure defamation setting.
Much before 1995, legal academics speculated that the
UK would go in much the same direction as the early US cases of Cubby v. CompuServe and Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy,
with liability being determined on the basis of awareness and
potential for control. In Parliament, a Draft Defamation Bill
was issued for public consultation in July 1995 by then Lord
Chancellor, Baron Mackay of Clashfern. Mackay’s commentary in the consultation document made much of the rise of
new technology via which “[i]nformation can be disseminated in a form which gives the recipient the option to convert
it to a readable form, either presented on a VDU screen,
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or printed on the recipient’s own printer”, before intoning,
darkly: “Progress is now so rapid, that tomorrow’s technology
may well make even these advances appear old fashioned.”
Nonetheless, Mackay, and subsequently Parliament, felt that
in principle the pre-existing common law defense of innocent
dissemination (Emmens v. Pottle) could and should be set on
a statutory footing, in a form which applies to Internet intermediaries. Thus, on July 4, 1996, just a few months after the
CDA came into force, the Royal Assent was given to a very
different legal rule.
Under §1 of the Defamation Act 1996, any person other
than the author, editor or publisher—that is, any secondary
distributor, including online parties—who is found to have
either been actually aware, or in a position in which the court
considers they should, objectively, have been aware, of a
defamatory statement published via their channels, will face
legal liability for publication of a defamatory statement.
The first ruling on the matter came in the form of an early
hearing on whether the §1 defense would be available to an
ISP which was hosting a Usenet newsgroup on which a defamatory posting had appeared. In Godfrey v. Demon, Morland J
ultimately ruled that a single, defamatory posting buried in
an otherwise innocuous newsgroup, one of many hundreds
of thousands of pages hosted but not edited or in any way
monitored by the ISP, would not be something of which the
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defendant should have been aware until actual notice had
been received. Godfrey had complained several times about
the defamation, but Demon had failed to remove it until the
system automatically deleted the post in question some ten
days after it was first made. This actual notice would, Morland ruled, render the defense unavailable to Demon at full
trial. The ISP consequently settled the case, paying Godfrey
a reported £15,000 in damages and a further £485,000
costs.
In 2002, the UK enacted domestic legislation incorporating §4 of the European Electronic Commerce Directive
2000/31/EC, which further entrenched the awareness-based
approach to online service provider liability for third-party
content by expanding it beyond defamation, to cover all
forms of unlawful content, both civil and criminal.
By comparison, across this period in the US, §230 as applied in Zeran v. AOL went from strength to strength, both
in terms of whom it protected, from traditional online hosts,
to website hosts of third party reviews, even non-commercial emailing lists and reposting of bulletin board posts, and
in terms of the legal claims it immunized. Not only defamation, but also the provision of false stock information, discriminatory third-party comments in breach of fair housing
laws, and even the marketing of obscene photographs of a
minor in a chatroom.
One of the very few exceptions to the scope of §230
remained intellectual property law—copyright in particular, which had its own, awareness-based regime under the
DMCA (and on which many have commented with regards to
what this may say about relative lobbying strengths viz-avis Congress).
Whereas in the US there have been a whole slew of
cases in which various defendants have successfully applied
the §230 defense, the UK equivalents under the Defamation
Act 1996 and the Ecommerce Regulations 2002 have produced very few reported cases. Instead, critics of the UK’s
position claim that British ISPs, rather than risk liability,
simply remove material at the simplest complaint, and thus,
they argue, these laws provide a clear chill upon freedom of
expression.
There is an absence of conclusive academic research
supporting these claims. Certainly, anecdotal evidence
suggests that generally UK ISPS do make some effort to
determine the legitimacy of complaints, while some, such
as the UK arm of the Facebook behemoth, are notoriously
arbitrary with what they consider to be perfectly acceptable
pursuant to their “community standards.” Nonetheless,
many in the internet industry continued to feel that intermediaries were being unfairly required to decide whether
material was unlawful and should be removed, with serious
consequences should they make a wrong decision. As one
former Demon staffer memorably and venomously put it
during an academic conference, “We have people to make
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these decisions for us: we call them courts.”
Nonetheless, little changed in the UK position until the
launch of the Libel Reform Campaign in 2009, with its manifesto Free Speech Isn’t Free. The LRC, comprised of various
interest groups led by Index on Censorship and English PEN,
called for numerous reforms of English defamation law,
some more desirable than others.
One early proposed reform was for internet intermediaries to be immunized from all forms of liability for third
party content. This was never going to be a popular idea
among many lawyers or Parliamentarians, who by and large
saw that §230, rather than encouraging service providers
to be proactive, simply emboldened them to shrug and do
nothing in response to claims of defamation. Further, as the
LRC may have realized had they given the specific matter
a little further legal research ahead of their initial report,
the UK’s commitments under EU law provided a framework
within which any changes here would be required to operate.
In the end, the eventual Defamation Act 2013 produced
what might be termed a very British compromise. Section
10 provides that secondary distributors, including internet
intermediaries, cannot be subject to legal action “unless the
court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an
action to be brought against [those directly responsible for
its publication]”.
Further, §5 provides a defense for “operators of websites”. While the term is not defined, it would seem designed
to encompass anyone who runs a social media site, a blog
platform, a BBS or any form of website to which individuals can post content (as distinct from traditional, passive
mere-hosting).
As first published, the defense seemed to make little
sense, and add nothing to the pre-existing legal position.
In essence, it provides that it is a defense for the website
operator to show that the disputed content was provided by
a third party. The defense is lost where the website operator acts maliciously, or where the client has been unable
to identify the actual source of the defamatory posting,
and has notified the operator, who has failed to respond “in
accordance with any provision contained in regulations.”
As ever, God (or, depending on one’s view of the provisions therein, and /or theology, the Devil) is in the details.
The Defamation (Operators of Websites) Regulations 2013
(which followed some months after the Act) set out a clear
notice and takedown procedure which, if followed, will shield
the Operator from liability. In essence, on receipt of a clear
notice which properly identifies the content complained of,
the Operator has a set period during which to respond, to
contact the source of the contested posting to see if they
wish to defend the content, and set circumstances in which
the posting must either be deleted, or may be left alone.
While in some respects (all 48 hours and five days, not
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counting weekends, bank or public holidays) these time
limits can rapidly begin to resemble Biblical numerology,
the instructions are clear, simple, and should avoid much
difficulty and expensive litigation for website operators in
future. In spirit, they are not dissimilar to the reposting provisions to be found in the US DMCA under §512(g), although
somewhat less complicated. Also, the §5 defense makes
clear that standard content moderation practices do not
constitute editing for the purposes of defamatory liability. Elsewhere, I have argued that this approach should be
broadened to encompass all areas of civil law with regards
to third party content online.
Though I’m very happy with the ‘third way’ approach
that the UK has evolved in relation to service provider liability for third party provided defamatory content as distinctly
different from §230 as applied by Zeran, to date this rule
applies only in one of the UK’s three legal jurisdictions, that
of England and Wales. In 2013, the responsible minister in
the Northern Ireland Assembly’s arcane, power-sharing
government elected not to adopt the new Defamation Act
into Northern Ireland law, officially stating that he would
“wait and see” how effective it proved in England and Wales.
There has since been much speculation about this decision,
but little progress as a series of unfortunate circumstances have once more collapsed the devolved government in
Northern Ireland for the time being.

Zeran v. AOL

In the UK’s other jurisdiction, Scotland—where, unlike
Northern Ireland, defamation law has long been markedly
different than that in England—the Scottish Law Commission has, following a 2016 public consultation on defamation law reform, recently issued a draft Defamation
and Malicious Publications (Scotland) Bill. Significantly,
§3 provides that there are to be “no proceedings against
secondary publishers”; exceptions to this general rule
will only be made in respect of specific categories of
secondary publisher to be determined by Scottish Ministers, granted authority to do so by §4. Distributors so
identified will be subject to awareness based liability in
exactly the same manner as under §1 of the Defamation
Act 1996. What categories of secondary publisher may be
exempted from liability and which will face liability, under
what ministerial regulations, remains as of yet unspecified. Scotland could, if this model is taken forward into
law, end up with a hybrid system between those with a
§230 style ‘get out of jail free card’ immunity, and those
subjected to something akin to the new English thirdway approach. With existing EU obligations in this regard
seemingly on borrowed time as the UK rushes towards
the Brave New Post-Brexit World, it seems that Scotland’s
options will soon be wide open. In Autumn 2017, the UK’s
broad approach may be one of rejecting the §230 style of
immunity, but by Autumn 2037, who knows?

This essay is part of a larger collection about the impact of Zeran v. AOL curated by Eric Goldman and Jeff Kosseff.

Page 3

Zeran

20

The Recorder presents a series of essays commemorating the 20th anniversary of Zeran v. AOL. 

AOL

‘AOL v. Zeran’: The
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‘Zeran’ has been the authority for 20 years; we
need a judicial opinion or legislative enactment
that better balances the statutory objective
with the original congressional intent to protect
users from unlawful and materially harmful
communicative acts online.
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T

wenty years ago, in AOL v. Zeran, a three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that 47 U.S.C. §230 immunized defendant AOL from liability for hosting and failing
to block a user’s mendacious electronic bulletin
board posts about plaintiff, even after AOL received notice of the existence of the offending posts on its servers.
This was the first federal appeals court opinion to define
the scope of protection under the Communications Decency Act. This reason alone made the decision and opinion
significant. But the Zeran opinion was most notable for its
conclusion: an online intermediary may not be held liable
for third-party user-generated content, even when it knows
that the content is unlawful.
This was an exceptional treatment under law. Generally,
under longstanding tort principles, publishers are as liable
for distributing material that they know to be unlawful as the
original author. But, for the panel, the online services could
not be treated in the same way; the internet is different. Without immunity, it explained, intermediaries would be exposed
to “liability for each message republished by their services.”
That kind of exposure “would have an obvious chilling effect.”
“Each notification” of objectionable content, the panel elaborated, “would require a careful yet rapid investigation of the
circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal
judgment concerning the information’s defamatory character,
and an on-the-spot editorial decision whether to risk liability
by allowing the continued publication of that information.”
Section 230’s purpose, the Fourth Circuit observed, was to
preserve the internet as an open forum for expression and

commerce. Imposing intermediary liability for the bad acts of
third-party users would undermine that purpose.
Twenty years later, we can safely say that the Zeran
formulation has helped to foster diversity and abundance
of user-generated online content. In this regard, it has given
effect to one of Congress’s chief objectives for §230.
But as the Zeran approach has aged, so has its pertinence, for the worse. Many of the search engines, social media and online marketplaces that benefit from the protection
today do far more than serve as “publisher[s] or speaker[s] of
any information provided by another information content provider.” The largest and most popular application developers
do so much more with their users’ content and data. Google,
Facebook and Amazon, for example, do not just publish or
edit user content. They design the ways by which their users
share information; they analyze and algorithmically sort that
information; and they repurpose and commercialize the data
in ways that are opaque to most consumers. To talk of publisher or notice liability in this context is quaint and inapposite. It is time that courts attend to the ways in which online
intermediaries design their services, rather than reflexively
apply publisher liability doctrine.
The Zeran panel also understated (if not misstated) the
Good Samaritan purpose of the statute. While it recognized
the important statutory objective of “self regulation,” it also
speculated that intermediaries would be reluctant to “screen
material” because doing so “would only lead to notice” which,
in turn, would “create a stronger basis for liability.” To be
sure, subsequent opinions by federal courts and state courts
of last resort pointedly declined to give the Good Samaritan
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language in §230(c)(2) real effect. But they cited Zeran as
authority. As the first to take up the statute, the Zeran panel’s failure to elaborate the “good faith” language in ways
that better achieved the self-regulation objectives of the
statute was consequential.
Today, in an irony of ironies, under the Good Samaritan
safe harbor, intermediaries do not gain anything from policing their users’ content. Many prominent ones do, of course.
But many do not. This has been especially troublesome with
regard to services that knowingly host or encourage unlawful user content, including and especially those that materially harm vulnerable people and historically subordinated
groups. User-generated nonconsensual porn, advertisements that promote the trafficking of minors, and targeted
advertisements that violate laws against racial discrimination in housing and employment are the most notorious examples. Legislators have proposed amendments to redress
some of these developments. But it is not at all clear they
will succeed; the proposals face substantial pushback from
the most powerful application developers.
Now is as good a time as any to recognize the Fourth
Circuit’s definitive contribution to the development of the
internet generally. In light of today’s state of affairs, however, it is plain that the Zeran framework, the prevailing
approach to §230 today, needs substantial retooling.
To be fair, as with most judicial opinions, the Zeran opinion was a creature of its time. In the mid- to late-1990s, writers, business leaders, futurists and cyberprofs were breathless and giddy about how the internet would transform the
way in which users learn, develop relationships, govern
themselves, and transact business. These early evangelists
promised that the internet would upturn or unsettle existing
laws, geopolitical boundaries, and government bureaucracies. Their excitement expressed itself in ways that sounded
every bit like the deregulatory, free-market worldview in
vogue at the time. (Compare, for example, President Bill
Clinton’s pronouncement in the 1996 State of the Union Address that “the era of big government is over” with the 1994
manifesto, “Cyberspace and the American Dream,” which
asserted that governments in the coming era “will be vastly
smaller (perhaps by 50 percent or more) than the current
one — this is an inevitable implication of the transition from
the centralized power structures of the industrial age to
the dispersed, decentralized institutions” of the networked
world.) Never mind that this worldview has rightfully always
been received with suspicion by people and groups that
have relied on zealous federal government oversight to
protect them from corporate abuses and insidious forms of
systemic discrimination. In retrospect, the argument for a
hands-off approach to online content arose from a naïve or
indulgently ideological conceit that has not born itself out.
Just consider that the largest intermediaries are acquiring
far reaching services in new markets and making their po-
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sitions in the economy and public life indispensable. Along
the way, they are pushing the limits of competition law and
adjudicating in the first instance which kinds of user information to distribute.
Surely, we could be forgiven for believing that, in its failure to elaborate the Good Samaritan safe harbor, the Zeran
panel was shortsighted or, worse, taken by cyberlibertarian
triumphalism. Many people were.
In fact, the Zeran panel was tasked with a difficult
responsibility: promoting free expression on the one hand
and encouraging intermediaries’ “self regulation” of objectionable speech on the other. It was to do this through the
doctrinal lens of publisher liability doctrine. Zeran argued
that, while the statute identifies “publishers,” it says nothing about distributors. This distinction matters, he posited,
because Congress presumably meant to keep distributor liability (or notice liability) fully applicable. The panel, however,
rejected the argument, explaining that distributor liability
“is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and
is therefore also foreclosed by §230.” Plaintiff’s argument
failed, it explained, because “[l]iability upon notice would
defeat the dual purposes advanced by §230,” creating “an
impossible burden” for online services.
This holding ended the panel’s substantive analysis of
the scope of immunity under §230, but should not have.
Even while its conclusion may have been correct, the holding begs the question about the Good Samaritan language
in §230(c)(2), a provision that invites courts to consider
services’ responsiveness to block or removal requests. The
provision asserts that intermediaries may not be held liable
for voluntarily taking steps “in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of … objectionable” content. Relying on
this protection, the panel could have determined whether,
as pled by Zeran, AOL acted in good faith in its handling of
the unlawful content. The outcome might have been the
same, but the rule would have been narrower and more
consistent with both objectives of the statute. But the panel
downplayed the significance of the “good faith” “self regulation” safe harbor, privileging the interest in promoting free
expression and commerce.
A narrower rule would have been more adaptable to different business models — even those of today. It would have,
on the one hand, imposed the obligation on applications to
act in good faith when adverting a policy against unlawful
content and, on the other hand, protected applications that
serve as true publishers or distributors. The problem of true
passive intermediaries knowingly hosting unlawful content
would remain, but at least then legislators would have a
clear understanding about the right fix.
Twenty years after the Fourth Circuit panel announced
it, we might expect that Zeran’s influence would wane,
particularly in a market that is as dynamic as that for online
applications. But the case remains an important authority
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across jurisdictions, which is a credit to the persuasiveness
of Judge Harvie Wilkinson’s opinion for the panel. It remains
above all an important authority on the §230 objective to
maintain the robust nature of communications online by
minimizing government interference. All we need now is
a judicial opinion or, likelier, a legislative enactment that
better balances that important statutory objective with
the original congressional intention to protect users from
unlawful and materially harmful communicative acts online.
Only then might we achieve a healthy and robust online
environment for communication for everyone.

Zeran v. AOL
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Healthy?
Twenty years after it was first litigated in
earnest, the U.S. Communications Decency Act’s
§230 remains both obscure and vital.
By Jonathan Zittrain

T

wenty years after it was first litigated in earnest,
the U.S. Communications Decency Act’s §230
remains both obscure and vital. Section 230
nearly entirely eliminated the liability of Internet
content platforms under state common law for
bad acts, such as defamation, occasioned by their users.
The platforms were free to structure their moderation and
editing of comments as they pleased, without a traditional
newspaper’s framework in which to undertake editing was
to bear responsibility for what was published. If the New
York Times included a letter to the editor that defamed
someone, the Times would be vulnerable to a lawsuit (to be
sure, so would the letter’s author, whose wallet size would
likely make for a less tempting target). Not so for online
content portals that welcome comments from anywhere—including the online version of the New York Times.
This strange medium-specific subsidy for online content platforms made good if not perfect sense in 1996. (My
generally positive thinking about it from that time, including
some reservations, can be found here.) The Internet was
newly mainstream, and many content portals comprised
the proverbial two people in a garage. To impose upon them
the burdens of traditional media would presumably require
tough-to-maintain gatekeeping. Comments sections, if they
remained at all, would have to be carefully screened to avoid
creating liability for the company. What made sense for a
newspaper publishing at most five or six letters a day amidst
its more carefully vetted articles truly couldn’t work for a
small Internet startup processing thousands or even millions
of comments or other contributions in the same interval.
Over time, the reviews elicited by Yelp and TripAdvisor, the
financial markets discussions on Motley Fool, the evolving ar-
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ticles on user-edited Wikipedia—all are arguably only possible
thanks to that §230 immunity conferred in 1996.
The immunity conferred is so powerful that there’s not
only a subsidy of digital over analog, but one for third-party
commentary over one’s own—or that of one’s employees. Last
year the notorious Gawker.com settled for $31 million after
being successfully sued for publishing a two-minute extract
of a private sex video. If Gawker, instead of employing a staff
whose words (and video excerpts) were attributable to the
company, had simply let any anonymous user post the same
excerpt—and indeed worked to assure that that user’s anonymity could not be pierced—it would be immune from an
identical invasion of privacy suit thanks to the CDA. From this
perspective, Gawker’s mistake wasn’t to host the video, but to
have its own employees be the ones to post it.
The internet environment of 2017 is a lot different than
that of 1997, and some of those two-people-in-a-garage ventures are now among the most powerful and valuable companies in the world. So does it make sense to maintain §230’s
immunities today?

An infant industry has grown up.
In 1997, it made sense on a number of fronts to treat the
Internet differently from its analog counterparts. For example, there was debate from the earliest mainstreaming of
Internet commerce about whether to make U.S. state sales
tax collection apply to Internet-based faraway purchases. The
fact that there was so little Internet commerce meant that
there was not a lot of money foregone by failing to tax; that
new companies (and, for that matter, existing ones) could try
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out e-commerce models without concerning themselves
from the start with tax compliance in multiple jurisdictions;
and that the whole Internet sector could gather momentum
if purchasers were enticed to go online—which in turn would
further entice more commerce, and other activity, online. I
was among those who therefore argued in favor of the de
facto moratorium on state sales tax. But that differential no
longer makes sense. A single online company—Amazon—now
accounts for about 5 percent of all U.S. retail sales, online or
off. It’s a good thing that Amazon’s physical expansion has
meant that it naturally has started collecting and remitting
state sales tax around the country.
Perhaps the evolution of the merits of equal treatment
for state sales tax provides a good model for a refined CDA:
companies below a certain size or activity threshold could
benefit from its immunities, while those who grow large
enough to facilitate the infliction of that much more damage from defamatory and other actionable posts might also
have the resources to employ a compliance department.
That would militate towards at least some standard to meet
in vetting or dealing with posts, perhaps akin to the light
duties of booksellers or newsstands towards the wares they
stock rather than the higher ones of newspapers towards
the letters they publish.
Apart from the first-order drawback of an incentive to
game the system by staying just under whatever size or activity threshold triggers the new responsibilities, there’s also
the question of noncommercial communities that can become large without having traditional corporate hierarchies
that lend themselves to direct legal accountability. Some
of the most important computing services in the world rely
on free and open source software, even as there remains a
puzzle of how software liability would work when there’s no
organized firm singly producing it. This puzzle has remained
unsolved even today, since liability for bugs or vulnerabilities in even corporate-authored software tends to be quite
minimal. That might change as the line between hardware
and software continues to blur with the Internet of Things.
Even for companies suited for new, light responsibilities
under a modified CDA, there might be a distinction made
between damages for past acts and duties for future ones.
The toughest part of the Zeran case even for those sympathetic to the CDA is that apparently AOL was repeatedly
told that the scandalous advertisement purporting to be
from Ken Zeran was in fact not at all related to him—and the
company was in a comparatively good position to confirm
that. Even then the company did nothing. It’s one thing to
have permitted some defamatory content to come through
amidst millions of messages; it’s another to be fully aware
of it once it’s posted, and to still not be charged with any
responsibility to deal with it. A more refined CDA might
underscore such a distinction, favoring the kind of knowledge of falsehood that’s at the heart of the heightened New
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York Times v. Sullivan barrier that public figures must meet
in establishing defamation by a newspaper, and also cover
knowledge that might come about after publication rather
than before—leading only to responsibility once the knowledge is gained and not timely acted upon.

The AI thicket.
Even massive online speech-mediating companies can
only hire so many people. With thousands of staffers around
the world apparently committed to reviewing complaints
arising over Facebook posts, the company still relies on
algorithms to sift helpful from unhelpful content. And here
the distinction between pre- and post-publication becomes
blurred, because services like Facebook and Twitter not only
host content—as a newspaper website does by permitting
comments to appear in sequence after an article—but they
also help people navigate it. A post might reach ten people
or a billion, depending on whether it’s placed in no news
feeds or many.
The CDA as it stands allows maximum flexibility for
salting feeds, since no liability will attach for spreading
even otherwise-actionable content far and wide. A refined
CDA could take into account the fact that Facebook and
others know exactly whom they’ve reached: perhaps a more
reasonable and fitting remedy for defamation would less be
to assess damages against the company for having abetted
it, but rather to require a correction or other followup to
go out to those who saw—and perhaps came to believe—the
defamatory content. (To be sure, this solution doesn’t work
for other wrongs such as invasion of privacy; no correction
can “uninvade” it among those who saw the content in
question.)
Such corrective, rather than compensatory, remedies
may be more fitting both for the wronged party and for the
publisher, but it could in turn make content elision much
more common. For example, in the context of traditional
book publishing, including for noninteractive digital books
like those within a Kindle, the CDA does not protect the
publisher against the author’s defamation. With a threat of
liability remaining, I’ve worried that in addition to damages,
a litigant might demand a digital retraction: a forced release
of a new version of an e-book to all e-readers that omits the
defamatory content.
Of course, if the challenged words are really defamatory that might be thought of as an improvement for
both injured party and for the reader. But if done without
notice to the reader, it smacks of propaganda, and to the
extent lawsuits or threats of same can induce defendant
publishers to cave—when caving doesn’t entail paying
out damages but rather altering the content they’ve
stewarded—it could come to happen all too frequently,
and with the wrong incentives. Similarly, an AI trained to
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avoid controversial subjects—perhaps defined as subjects
that could give rise to threats of litigation—might be
very much against the public interest. This would mirror
some of the damaging incentives of Europe’s “right to be
forgotten” as developed against search engines. Any refinement of the CDA that could inspire AI-driven content
shaping runs this risk, with the perverse solace that even
with today’s CDA the major content platforms are already
shaping content in ways that are not understandable or
reviewable outside the companies.
Related to the power of AI is the refined power to personalize content in 2017, including by jurisdiction. If a Texas
court finds something defamatory under Texas law, such as
maligning certain food products, it might not be defamatory
under, say, Massachusetts law. Any diminution of CDA 230’s
immunities might in the first order impel online platforms
like Facebook to have to police away any food disparagement—even if it’s posted and read by Facebook users in
food-indifferent Massachusetts. If there were to be exposure
under Texas law, perhaps it should only arise if the content
were shown (or continued to be shown) in Texas. This could
also provide a helpful set of pressures on the substantive
doctrine: Texas citizens, including legislators, might rue
being excluded from certain content online that’s available
in other states.

Zeran v. AOL

The internet’s development over the past twenty
years has benefited immeasurably from the immunities
conferred by §230. We’ve been lucky to have it. But any
honest account must acknowledge the collateral damage
it has permitted to be visited upon real people whose
reputations, privacy, and dignity have been hurt in ways
that defy redress. Especially as that damage becomes
more systematized—now part of organized campaigns to
shame people into silence online for expressing opinions
that don’t fit an aggressor’s propaganda aims—platforms’
failures to moderate become more costly, both to targets
of harassment and to everyone else denied exposure to
honestly-held ideas.
As our technologies for sifting and disseminating
content evolve, and our content intermediaries trend
towards increasing power and centralization, there are
narrow circumstances where a path to accountability for
those intermediaries for the behavior of their users might
be explored. Incrementalism gets a bad rap, but it’s right to
proceed slowly if at all here, with any tweaks subject to rigorous review of how they impact the environment. The vice
from the indiscriminate nature of §230’s broad immunity is
somewhat balanced by a virtue of everyone knowing exactly
where matters stand—line-drawing carries its own costs and
distortions.
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